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THE NEW REGULATORY IMPERATIVE 
FOR INSURANCE 
RICK SWEDLOFF* 
Abstract: This Article addresses emerging gaps in consumer protection. Insurers, 
like companies in other industries, are revolutionizing their practices with artifi-
cial intelligence and big data. Insurers are finding new ways to price risks and 
policies, tailor coverage, offer advice to purchasers, identify fraud, and sequence 
the payment of claims. These changes have subverted consumer protections built 
into current regulatory regimes, and regulators are struggling to adapt. This is not 
a niche problem. Insurance is a vital part of the U.S. economy: it rakes in over 
1.2 trillion dollars in premiums a year; employs more than 2.7 million people; 
and undergirds transactions as simple as home purchases and as complex as cor-
porate mergers and acquisitions, the multi-trillion-dollar tort system, and a vast 
system of private risk management and loss avoidance advice. Despite playing 
these critical roles, the insurance market is surprisingly inefficient. Deep infor-
mation asymmetries make it difficult for consumers to evaluate the quality of 
policies and carriers, for insurers to price risks properly, and make it possible for 
both sides to act opportunistically. Further, behavioral barriers hamper purchas-
ers, who often buy too little or the wrong insurance. And, in some markets, pri-
vate insurers might not be willing to supply enough insurance because the under-
lying risks cannot be adequately spread. Insurance regulation is a necessary part 
of solving these complex market failures. Most of the previous legal scholarship 
about algorithmic justice has been in the context of information platforms, crimi-
nal justice, and employment discrimination. This Article connects to those dis-
cussions and expands them in the specific context of insurance. It does so by 
providing a taxonomy of the changes in the insurance industry, the potential dan-
ger to consumers as a result of those changes, the reasons for regulation, and the 
ways that regulators must adapt to protect individual consumers and the insur-
ance market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2019, New York’s Department of Financial Services issued a 
guidance letter to life insurers.1 The letter requires insurers that price their pol-
icies with “algorithms and predictive models” to take care not to include data 
about “race, color, creed, national origin, status as a victim of domestic vio-
lence, past lawful travel, or sexual orientation in any manner, or any other pro-
tected class” for any underwriting or rating purpose.2 The letter also requires 
that insurers using these models explain why some policyholders received 
higher prices than others.3 
This letter presents a bit of a puzzle. On its face, it does nothing more 
than tell insurers to obey existing law and be transparent in doing so.4 But, in 
reality, it represents a state wading into a new regulatory quagmire for insur-
ance. The industry is undergoing a quiet revolution. New technologies—like 
artificial intelligence (AI)5 powered by big data6—allow this once-staid indus-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Insurance Circular Letter No. 1, RE: Use of External Consumer Data and Information Sources 
in Underwriting for Life Insurance, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Insurance 
Circular Letter No. 1], https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2019_01 [https://
perma.cc/NG7Z-6DAB]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 New York law already prohibits insurers from using a policyholder’s “race, color, creed, nation-
al origin, or disability” in pricing, see, for example, N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606(a)(1) (McKinney 2019), so 
the letter does nothing more than remind insurers of this existing responsibility and require additional 
transparency in doing so. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2016) (extolling transparency in dealing 
with algorithms). 
 5 AI is best understood as a set of techniques employed by computer scientists to help computers 
rationally solve problems, no matter what obstacles they encounter. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6–7 
(2016) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE]. Many of these techniques have been around for dec-
ades but have only recently become powerful enough to gain notoriety because computers are faster and 
computer scientists can now draw on vast collections of unstructured information—so-called big data. 
See Randy Bean, How Big Data Is Empowering AI and Machine Learning at Scale, MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. (May 8, 2017), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-big-data-is-empowering-ai-and-machine-
learning-at-scale/ [http://perma.cc/K4WP-WAVP] (“The availability of greater volumes and sources 
of data is, for the first time, enabling capabilities in AI and machine learning that remained dormant 
for decades due to lack of data availability, limited sample sizes, and an inability to analyze massive 
amounts of data in milliseconds.”). 
 6 In the past decades, AI has made significant advances based on increases in computing power, 
refinements in the algorithms that run the AI, and because of access to big data to train the algorithms. 
Big data are large, unstructured, and often unruly sets of data from a variety of sources, including 
information gathered from the internet and from the physical world. This can include information like 
“transactions, email, video, images, clickstream, logs, search queries, health records, and social net-
working interactions.” Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in 
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013). Information from the physi-
cal world includes data from sources such as “sensors deployed in infrastructure such as communica-
 
2034 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2031 
try to transform the way it prices, creates, and delivers insurance policies; in-
teracts with customers; and the way it analyzes and evaluates policyholder 
claims. New York’s fear, a fear that is playing out throughout the country, is 
that these changes are undermining long-standing consumer protections.7 
Pricing with AI permits an insurer to create more precise underwriting 
and pricing by analyzing more data—and new kinds of data—than traditional 
statistical methods allow. This has real upsides for insurers, which may be able 
to reap higher profits, gain a larger market share of the most desirable risks,8 
and mitigate the twin evils of insurance: adverse selection9 and moral hazard.10 
But pricing with AI also allows insurers to intentionally, or inadvertently, ex-
ploit long-known market failures and burden policyholders in new ways. AI 
likely exacerbates information asymmetries between insurers and policyhold-
ers, which makes it more difficult for consumers to evaluate the prices they are 
                                                                                                                           
tions networks, electric grids, global positioning satellites, roads and bridges, as well as in homes, 
clothing, and mobile phones.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 7 New York is not the only state working on these new issues. The largest insurance regulatory 
organization, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has empaneled a multi-year 
working group to evaluate “both the potential concerns and benefits for consumers and the ability to 
ensure data is being used in a manner compliant with state insurance statutes and regulations.” NAT’L 
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BIG DATA (EX) WORKING GROUP: WORK PLAN FOR 2017, at 1 (2017), 
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/cmte_ex_bdwg_related_work_plan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6KPT-U6BF]. 
 8 Insurers that classify risks well can set more competitive prices, allowing them to add low-risk 
policyholders to their own pool and skim them away from competitors. This, in turn, lowers the insur-
er’s risk of paying out and leaves competitors with a comparatively worse pool, raising the competi-
tors’ risk of paying out. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEO-
RY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 68 (1986); Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selec-
tion and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003). 
 9 Adverse selection is the fear that only high-risk policyholders will purchase insurance. When 
insurers price policies more accurately, the lower prices should help entice low-risk policyholders to 
buy insurance rather than go without. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance 
Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403, 407 (1985) (“[I]nsurance is only one of a number of ways of 
satisfying the demand for protection against risk. With few exceptions, insurance need not be pur-
chased; people can forgo it if insurance is too expensive.”). But see generally David Hemenway, Pro-
pitious Selection, 105 Q.J. ECON. 1063 (1990) (discussing the concept of propitious selection wherein 
people with high levels of risk-avoidance are more likely to buy insurance); Peter Siegelman, Adverse 
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (suggesting that 
in some markets low-risk policyholders are more likely to purchase insurance because they are more 
risk averse than higher-risk policyholders). 
 10 Moral hazard is the concern that once indemnified for a loss, policyholders will not take pre-
caution to avoid the loss or mitigate the loss if it occurs. Pricing based on risk provides a signal to 
policyholders about their riskiness. If policyholders have control over the features upon which they 
are being classified, a higher price may encourage changes in insured behavior—either by taking more 
precaution or reducing the frequency of the risk-creating activity. See Abraham, supra note 9, at 413 
(“Risk classifications should reflect differences in expected losses between classes of insureds; ideal-
ly, they should also create loss prevention incentives for insureds.”); Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, 
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
1412, 1418–19 (2013). 
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given, may allow insurers to charge legally protected groups more for insur-
ance, and may create new privacy burdens for policyholders. AI also allows 
insurers to individuate prices more easily based not on the risk that the policy-
holder will suffer a loss, but on the likelihood the policyholder will change 
carriers, thus making it more difficult for policyholders to find new coverage 
even in competitive markets. 
Unfortunately, the classic regulatory response to these concerns—
articulated by New York’s guidance letter—will not work in this new world.11 
In the old world, prohibiting the use of certain features, and obvious proxies 
for those features, prevents invidious discrimination in insurance pricing. Re-
quiring a causal story—that is, requiring the insurer to explain why one poli-
cyholder is paying more for the same coverage than another—makes it easier 
for the regulator to consider whether prices are based on riskiness and whether 
insurers should be using particular characteristics for pricing. These same ap-
proaches fall flat in the new world. Unlike traditional statistical methods, 
which require humans to first guess which traits are likely to be relevant to the 
risk that a policyholder will suffer a loss, AI does not have prior judgments 
about riskiness built into the model. The algorithm sorts through the data to 
find correlations in an iterative process.12 Even if insurers require the AI to 
ignore certain prohibited categories, the algorithm can easily find a combina-
tion of factors that correlate with a prohibited category, resulting in significant-
ly higher prices for protected groups. Likewise, AI does not work by creating a 
causal story and any attempt to fabricate one based on thousands of character-
istics will be, at best, a post hoc rationalization.13 
Pricing is but one of several AI-enabled changes in the insurance industry. 
Insurers are using AI and unstructured data to create new types of policies and 
individualize coverages for particular policyholders,14 replace human insur-
                                                                                                                           
11 Insurance Circular Letter No. 1, supra note 1. 
 12 Today’s AI has significant advantages over older statistical techniques and older versions of 
AI. In contrast to traditional statistical techniques—where insurers have to choose a set of independent 
variables that they believe have some causal relationship to the subject being studied—today’s AI 
allows computer algorithms to solve problems in a less-supervised way. This also stands in contrast to 
older AI techniques where programmers tried to make computers solve problems through emulating 
human experts by translating a human decision tree into software code. For example, one might teach 
a computer to play chess by coding a series of “if/then” statements: “if the pieces are in this position, 
an expert would make one of these decisions.” See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 5, at 8. 
Today, machine learning and other techniques allow AI to learn in a less supervised manner. Data 
scientists write code to train the computer, but the AI learns to solve complex problems without the 
oversight of older techniques. See id. at 8–9; see also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A 
Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 405 (2017); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and 
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014). 
 13 See James Davey & Rick Swedloff, Insurance Without Cause (Jan. 12, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 14 See infra Part II. 
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ance brokers and agents,15 more cheaply identify fraudulent claims, and se-
quence claims for more efficient payment.16 Each of these changes may un-
dermine existing consumer protections aimed at fixing endemic market fail-
ures.17 For example, information asymmetries make it difficult for consumers to 
understand and make good choices among different carriers and policies. Using 
AI to create new forms of coverage might erode protections aimed at making 
sure policy language is clear and policies contain minimum protections. AI-
powered robo-advisors may work around licensing and education requirements 
for human intermediaries focused on protecting consumers from uninformed 
and unscrupulous advice-givers. And, when insurers expand their use of AI in 
fraud investigations, insurers may have a greater ability to act opportunistically 
and rescind contracts after a loss has occurred based on policyholder misstate-
ments. AI further makes it easier and cheaper for insurers to investigate more 
claims, delay payment to more policyholders, and pay less to each claimant. 
As AI changes how insurers use individual data, price risks, cover policy-
holders, and handle claims, the regulatory answers to existing market failures 
must adapt to continue to protect both consumers and the marketplace. This 
Article provides a theoretical and practical taxonomy of the challenges and 
concerns raised by insurers’ use of new technology. It then offers thoughts 
about whether and how to change regulatory priorities. To make those deci-
sions, regulators—including legislatures, courts, and state insurance agen-
cies—have to ask not just “how” to regulate in this new world, but rethink 
“why.” Fundamentally, this is a question of algorithmic justice. Most of the 
previous legal scholarship about algorithmic justice has been in the context of 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 See infra Part IV. 
 17 This is true even if one assumes that the data used to power the models that create these possi-
bilities are unbiased, representative, and appropriate for the task. Big data has significant problems, 
including issues with reliability, bias, and representativeness. See generally Danah Boyd & Kate 
Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly 
Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 668 (2012) (“Large data sets from Internet sources are 
often unreliable, prone to outages and losses, and these errors and gaps are magnified when multiple 
data sets are used together.”). For example, “in the case of social media data, there is a ‘data cleaning’ 
process: making decisions about what attributes and variables will be counted, and which will be 
ignored. This process is inherently subjective.” See id. at 667. Further, not everyone is on Twitter or 
Facebook, and those who do use such platforms are not created equally. Some users post far more 
often than others. See id. at 669. Moreover, given the enormous number of data points considered, 
there is a risk that the algorithms will find correlations with statistical significance even if there is no 
meaningful connection between the variables. See Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mis-
take?, FIN. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00
144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/CW9T-ELEH]; Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Opinion, Eight (No, Nine!) 
Problems with Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nyti.ms/1kgErs2 [https://perma.cc/
GT3Z-5W5K]. 
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information platforms, criminal justice,18 and employment discrimination.19 
This Article connects to those discussions and expands them in the specific 
context of insurance. 
This Article begins in Part I by laying out the basics of insurance regula-
tion—control of pricing and pooling, oversight of coverage and insurance con-
tracts, and supervision of insurers and their conduct in the market—and the 
reasons for those regulations.20 That latter discussion is critical to understand-
ing Parts II–IV, which describe more deeply the ways that AI is changing in-
surance business practices and the ways that regulators must respond to those 
concerns. 
Part II focuses on insurers’ use of AI to tailor prices more specifically to 
individual risks and to the consumer’s individual willingness to pay, regardless 
of the risk presented.21 Part III discusses the potential for insurers to use AI to 
create bespoke, individuated insurance policies.22 Finally, Part IV discusses the 
use of robo-advisors and concerns about so-called claims-optimization.23 
I. THE HOWS AND WHYS OF INSURANCE REGULATION 
This Part briefly sketches the reasons for regulating insurance and the 
means by which legislatures, regulators, and courts do so. Insurance regulation 
can be broken into three rough categories: regulation of pricing and pooling, 
control of forms and coverage, and general oversight of insurers and their con-
duct in the market.24 The justifications for these regulations differ in their par-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See generally, e.g., ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEIL-
LANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias 
out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. 
REV. 109 (2017). 
 19 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
869–92 (2017). See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discussing the disparate impact of data mining causing employment discrim-
ination); James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 
ONLINE 164 (2017), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Grimmelmann
Westreich.final_-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/99GQ-7GDP] (discussing a fictional Supreme Court opinion 
addressing the concerns of data mining in employment decisions). 
 20 See infra Part I. 
 21 See infra Part II. 
 22 See infra Part III. 
23 See infra Part IV. 
 24 Traditional state regulators are involved in a number of different facets of the insurance indus-
try, including the following: making sure that insurers have the financial capacity to pay in the event 
that their policyholders suffer the covered losses; overseeing the prices that insurers charge; regulating 
the content of insurance policies; requiring certain types of coverage; policing insurer behavior in 
advertising, sales, and the payment of claims; and operating residual pools to provide coverage to 
individuals who cannot afford coverage on the open market. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL 
SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 113 (6th ed. 2015). 
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ticulars, but all of the justifications can be traced back to two main themes: the 
important role that insurance plays in society and endemic market failures. 
It is often unstated, but an obvious justification for insurance regulation is 
the importance of insurance in the economy. Policyholders pay over $1 trillion 
in insurance premiums annually25 and the industry employs approximately 2.7 
million people.26 But more than these numbers, insurance undergirds large and 
diverse parts of the economy. Without insurance, transactions as simple as 
home purchases and as complex as corporate mergers and acquisitions would 
be prohibitively expensive,27 the multi-trillion-dollar tort system would likely 
crumble,28 and private parties would lose important risk-management and loss-
avoidance advice.29 Insurance also provides policyholders with both objective 
financial security and a subjective sense of security, which might increase poli-
cyholder wellbeing.30 
The insurance market, however, is rife with inefficiencies. For example, 
there are significant information asymmetries in the marketplace.31 “[T]here 
are limits to what an insurance company can find out about the people looking 
for insurance, and it’s hard to monitor consumers’ behavior once they have 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Facts + Statistics: Industry Overview, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/
facts-statistics-industry-overview [https://perma.cc/SQF5-3QHD] (“U.S. insurance industry net pre-
miums written totaled $1.22 trillion in 2018 . . . .”). 
 26 “The U.S. insurance industry employed 2.7 million people in 2018 . . . .” Id. This is approxi-
mately 2% of the labor force, which stood at approximately 130 million people in 2019, according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat08.htm [https://perma.cc/9LYY-D6BF] (last 
modified Jan. 22, 2020). 
 27 For example, the guarantees provided by homeowners’ insurance make home mortgages far 
more affordable. Banks are willing to lend to homebuyers, because they know that the insurance pro-
tect the security on which that loan is based, the home. 
 28 Insurance is a key element to tort lawsuits, see generally Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as 
Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 
(2005) (explaining, in part, how insurance is a precursor and regulator of tort liability), a key to almost 
every field of liability that has been studied carefully, see generally Baker & Swedloff, supra note 10 
(showing how insurance shapes conduct and liability in fields as diverse as corporate conduct, medical 
malpractice, automobile liability, and legal malpractice), and shapes who sues whom, for how much, 
and for what, see Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 736–39 (2012) 
(explaining that insurance is a necessary precursor to most lawsuits). Given this, it is unsurprising that 
insurance and tort operate, as Ken Abraham so aptly phrased it, as twin stars revolving around each 
other. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008). 
 29 See generally Baker & Swedloff, supra note 10 (describing the mechanisms by which insurers 
regulate private conduct). 
 30 See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the 
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (1961). 
 31 See generally Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The 
Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 491 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (describing the information problems fac-
ing insurers and consumers). 
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it.”32 Consumers likewise face significant information challenges. In part, 
these challenges exist because of the time lag between when consumers pur-
chase policies and when consumers ask insurers to fulfill the policy’s promise. 
This makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate whether insurers are selling 
the product they promised, engaging in risky investment strategies, or have 
unfair claims practices. The asymmetries also exist because insurers are repeat 
players in contracting, have more data on the causes of loss, and are more like-
ly to have a steely-eyed view of the likelihood that any individual will suffer a 
loss. Regulators must thus step in because consumers do not have the 
knowledge, information, or skills necessary to evaluate the insurers’ business 
methods, including the rates they receive, the terms of the policies, and the 
insurers’ investment strategies or claims and settlement practices. 
Information asymmetries are only part of the story. Insurance regulation 
also socializes certain risks more broadly and helps correct behavioral quirks 
of insurance consumers.33 In some contexts, the risks that are borne by indi-
viduals are not easily spread in private markets. Where insurance markets fail 
to do so, risk spreading comes through regulatory socialization of the risk. 
There are multiple reasons that the market might not function properly to 
spread risk. For example, the current pandemic shows exactly how bad corre-
lated risks can be. If one business interruption insurance policyholder suffers a 
risk, an entire nation does so. Likewise, the risk of flood or wildfire is highly 
correlated—if one home in an area suffers a loss, many will likely suffer the 
same loss. In these circumstances, it might be reasonable to subsidize or cross-
collateralize that risk in some other way, such as across multiple types of disas-
ters or across all homeowners in a state.34 In other cases, insurance is social-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 494. These information asymmetries lead to the adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lems described above. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 33 This Article borrows the term “socialization of risk” from Spencer Kimball, who used it to 
mean a pressure that often exists to expand coverage to cover a greater number of risks. See Kimball, 
supra note 30, at 512. This Article uses the term “socialization” in a slightly different way than Kim-
ball. The term is used more broadly here to include a need to force coverage over a greater number of 
insureds to create adequate coverage. That said, this Article acknowledges that the term “socializa-
tion” invites a particular kind of attack, but in this context, insurance can only work when more people 
have coverage. 
 34 Kyle Logue and Omri Ben-Shahar make two basic arguments against subsidized flood insur-
ance. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576, 579, 586–89, 609–11 (2016). First, they show that the national flood in-
surance program does not encourage tighter and safer building codes. See id. at 576, 586–89. Second, 
they claim that flood insurance benefits the rich more than the poor. See id. at 579, 609–11. The first 
problem could be dealt with by the current program: to qualify, homeowners have to meet building 
standards. This is just insurance as governance in action. The second issue is more of a concern. But 
one could argue that beachfront ownership is valuable socially and something the government wants 
to encourage. Alternatively, one could argue that failure to subsidize would result in beachfront real 
estate being more unaffordable because homeowners would have to self-insure. 
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ized because it enables other policy goals. For example, when high-risk drivers 
are priced out of the auto insurance market, states often force private insurers 
to subsidize the actuarially fair rate through residual pools or other mecha-
nisms.35 This may make sense because driving is critical to employment and 
because auto insurance protects victims as much as drivers.36 As such, it is in-
cumbent on regulators to make sure that as many drivers as possible are cov-
ered by insurance. 
In other situations, decision-making errors might lead to consumers pur-
chasing less insurance than is reasonable. Consider, in this context, unem-
ployment insurance and social security. Here, society might decide that it is 
important to provide some income to those who are temporarily out of work or 
those who are past the age of retirement.37 To the extent that people are unable 
or unlikely to insure themselves adequately, the government could step in and 
mandate coverage. This is precisely the kind of coverage that substitutes for 
more traditional family and community risk spreading. 
The remainder of this Part more fully fleshes out these ideas in the con-
text of specific regulatory regimes. It is not meant to be a comprehensive list of 
regulations or of judicial and legislative interventions in the insurance market. 
Rather, this Part roughly covers the regulatory space affected by the introduc-
tion of AI into insurers’ business practices. Section A discusses the regulation 
of pricing and pooling insurance.38 Section B discusses the regulation of dif-
ferent coverage and forms of insurance.39 Section C discusses the general regu-
lation of insurers and the market.40 As AI changes the way that insurers do 
business, the justifications for these regulations need rethinking. Some readers, 
those well versed in insurance regulation, may want to skip this Part. 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Even if insurance is priced in an actuarially fair manner, for many high-risk individuals, insur-
ance is simply unaffordable—that is, the actuarially fair price is beyond the individual’s ability to pay. 
Where states value the underlying activity or the insurance provides socially valuable security, states 
can intervene in the market to subsidize the purchase of insurance. One common mechanism is a re-
sidual pool. Many states establish these to cover insurance for driving, medical malpractice, property 
insurance, beach and windstorm damage, and workers compensation. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, 
supra note 24, at 149–50. States typically do this by forcing insurers that participate in the “voluntary” 
market to take responsibility for profits and losses from people who are too high-risk to purchase 
insurance on the open market. Alternatively, states can force insurers to take on risks that they would 
not otherwise insure and then provide government reinsurance, allow the insurer to cross-subsidize 
high-risk policyholders with lower-risk ones in the voluntary market, and/or provide direct subsidies 
to keep rates low. See id. 
 36 It does so by providing the inevitable victims of auto accidents with an easy, if often inade-
quate, source of compensation. 
 37 This is as much a descriptive as a normative point, given the history of social security insur-
ance. 
 38 See infra Part I.A. 
 39 See infra Part I.B. 
 40 See infra Part I.C. 
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A. Regulation of Pricing and Pooling 
In an ideal market, risks are evenly distributed across society, insurers 
charge each insured commensurate with that policyholder’s risk, and policy-
holders can afford all of the insurance they desire. Insurers in this ideal world 
perfectly predict the probability that a particular policyholder will suffer a loss 
in the policy period and perfectly price the policy to match that risk.41 Insurers 
are unable to charge more than the policyholder’s expected loss because com-
petition forces insurers to cut premiums to a price that matches the insurer’s 
expenses, minus expected losses. Insurers that charge too much lose customers 
and market share, causing them to lower their prices; insurers that charge too 
little do not have enough capital to cover policyholder claims and go out of 
business. On the demand side, policyholders in an ideal market are wealthy 
enough to pay for the coverage they want. 
But, of course, the market in the real world does not work that way. In the 
real world, there are information asymmetries between the insurers and the 
policyholders, individuals do not always make good decisions, and thin mar-
kets—and bad information—may allow insurers to price less than competitive-
ly. Further, when insurers charge actuarially fair prices, some policyholders 
might not be able to afford necessary coverage and some products might bur-
den vulnerable groups in ways that society finds inappropriate. 
Governments have a number of tools to deal with these market failures 
and public policy concerns, including traditional rate regulation, regulation of 
categories upon which insurers rate risk to protect vulnerable groups, limiting 
the amount of variation in risk classification, and the creation of residual 
pools.42 These topics are covered below. 
1. Limits on Risk Classification 
Insurers generally try to price policies to match the risk that an insured 
will suffer a loss in the policy period and the likely size of that loss. To make 
that prediction, insurers compare the loss experience in the market generally 
with the features and experience of individual policyholders.43 This pricing by 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Abraham, supra note 9, at 408. 
 42 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 24. InsurerTech and AI may be assisting with the 
identification of high-risk individuals, creation of smoother operating pools, etc., but there is no nec-
essary regulatory response to these technological changes. Thus, the discussion of residual pools is 
limited in this Article. 
 43 Abraham, supra note 9, at 413–14. Feature rating includes observable traits of the policyholder 
like age, weight, health, gender, whether the policyholder smokes or drinks, exercises, or has a family 
history of heart disease. Policyholders can only control some of these features. Experience rating 
looks at whether the policyholder has suffered losses in the past. The insurer then compares the fea-
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risk is at the heart of what insurers do. Its general benefits and costs are well 
known in the literature, including increasing profits and managing moral haz-
ard and adverse selection.44 
In some cases, however, states limit the ability of insurers to price accord-
ing to risk because of the social costs of risk classification. Pricing based on 
risk, even if accurate, could unfairly burden vulnerable groups and those 
whose riskiness is undeserved with higher prices or skimpier coverage, insur-
ers might use information to price policies that should otherwise be kept pri-
vate, and additional risk classification might be socially inefficient. Although 
there are other concerns with risk classification, these are the only concerns 
really addressed by regulation. This Subsection describes those concerns and 
the limited regulation that exists to address them. 
Of course, all risk classification burdens some groups more than others: 
those who represent a higher risk of loss pay more than those who represent a 
lower risk. Whether this is fair depends on what particular conception of fair-
ness one applies. Pricing based purely on the policyholder’s individual risk of 
loss, a sort of libertarian pricing, seems fair because premiums represent some-
thing intrinsic to the policyholder and, to the extent technologically and eco-
nomically feasible, no policyholder will be asked to subsidize another’s riski-
ness with higher premiums. This then should allow insurers to more fully con-
trol moral hazard and adverse selection. 
But purely risk-based pricing might be based on undeserved or immutable 
characteristics, or the riskiness might be based on historical and sociological 
injustices and inequities. Classifying explicitly on race, religion, or national 
origin likely reinforces existing inequalities by burdening the group with high-
er prices or by defining the group as inherently riskier.45 One could argue that 
prohibiting use of those categories would be fair. In this context, fairness de-
pends on a particular social construction of equity because the higher risks 
may be the result of historical burdens on a particular group. Similarly, prohib-
iting the use of an undeserved or uncontrollable characteristic in insurance 
pricing could be seen as fair, especially where the higher prices will not reduce 
the likelihood of the risk occurring.46 For example, women who have suffered 
                                                                                                                           
tures and experiences of the individual to the insurers’ past losses across the population at large. See 
id. 
 44 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 45 Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
195, 217 (2014) (arguing that using these suspect classifications “reinforces or perpetuates broader 
social inequalities or . . . causes some sort of expressive harm by acknowledging and legitimating that 
prior unfair treatment”). 
 46 See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study 
in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 384–85 (1997). As Alexander Tabar-
rok notes in the context of pricing based on health risks: 
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domestic abuse need more health services throughout their lives, but charging 
more for these expected costs might be unfair under some conceptions of equi-
ty and equality.47 This is true because the policyholders cannot change the im-
mutable fact of having suffered domestic abuse to respond to higher prices and 
in no sense deserve the consequences of having been abused. 
It likewise seems fair to prohibit pricing insurance on correlations that do 
not have obvious causal stories. Even where one could tell a plausible story, 
the pricing might seem unfair. Imagine that there is a correlation between death 
and the number of followers one has on Twitter. We could create a causal story 
for the correlation: for example, it could be that the person who tweets more, 
gains more followers, but does so at the expense of exercise and is thus likely 
to die earlier. But, in truth, this is just post hoc narrative construction. Does the 
ability to tell a plausible story change whether it is fair to use that characteris-
tic? Does this correlation make it fair to use number of Twitter followers in 
risk classification? This is a complex question in the context of fairness and 
one that AI brings to the fore. 
Risk classification also raises privacy concerns. Insurers might rely on in-
timate information such as credit score, HIV status, genetic information, sexual 
orientation, drug and alcohol use, lifestyle, exercise, etc., to price insurance.48 
Even if answers to these questions are relevant to pricing and risk, they might be 
part of a personal sphere of information that society wishes to protect. Nonethe-
less, if left unregulated, policyholders are forced to answer these intrusive 
questions, because if they fail to do so truthfully, they could be denied cover-
age or have coverage voided after a loss.49 
Further, risk classification might be socially inefficient. If risk classifica-
tion is expensive, but fails to bring new insureds into the pool, it is socially 
wasteful.50 And, in some circumstance, classifying risks might inhibit high-
risk, socially beneficial behaviors51 or inhibit the acquisition of socially useful 
                                                                                                                           
First, the intuition that those with higher risks should bear the costs seems less justifia-
ble when the higher risk is not a matter of choice. Is it right that someone with the Hun-
tington’s gene should have to pay potentially staggering insurance bills or even be de-
nied health insurance altogether? Second, charging higher premiums will not reduce the 
number of people with Huntington’s. Thus, in this case, there is no efficiency gain from 
charging high risk elements larger premiums (only a wealth transfer). 
Alexander Tabarrok, Genetic Testing: An Economic and Contractarian Analysis, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 
75, 80 (1994). 
 47 See Hellman, supra note 46, at 356–57, 369, 384. 
 48 Avraham et al., supra note 45, at 207–08. 
 49 See infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text. 
 50 Avraham et al., supra note 45, at 208–09. 
 51 Id. at 205. For example, if high medical malpractice insurance premiums drive obstetricians out 
of market, risk classification may be inefficient. See Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data 
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information.52 Lastly, higher rates might make it impossible for some people to 
participate in important life activities like driving and homeownership. 
Given these concerns, it may be reasonable to have insureds who repre-
sent different levels of riskiness cross-subsidize each other, despite the in-
fringement that this creates on the libertarian ideal of actuarial fairness. States 
have responded to these equity and equality concerns, albeit crudely. For ex-
ample, some—but by no means all—states prohibit the use of particular varia-
bles, like race, religion, and national origin, to set prices for consumer lines of 
insurance.53 For some lines of insurance, some states also ban the use of gen-
der, sexual orientation, and age for pricing risk.54 Similarly, some states pro-
hibit health insurers from asking for or collecting genetic information.55 And a 
much smaller set of states prohibit the use of genetic information for life and 
disability insurance, which can be seen as a response to fears about both priva-
cy and encouraging the acquisition of valuable information.56  
These regulations are fairly weak. Typically, these laws prohibit only the 
use of a characteristic as an independent variable in classifying risk. The laws 
do not necessarily ban the use of obvious proxies to prohibited characteris-
tics—such as a zip codes for race—or consider the problem of systematically 
higher rates for suspect classes based on non-discriminatory characteristics—
disparate impact.57 In part, this weak regulation is a recognition that there is 
not a single conception of what is fair or just in insurance pricing. As will be 
discussed below, even these weak state protections are no longer viable in an 
era of AI-assisted risk assessment. 
There is little federal backstop to state regulation—and what federal law 
exists is found only in the context of health and homeowners insurance. This is 
not surprising, given the limited role of the federal government in insurance 
regulation and the fraught discussion of fairness above. The Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) limits what features an insurer can use in setting health insurance 
rates and explicitly precludes the use of other features. Gender is not listed and 
                                                                                                                           
(R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 347–48 (2014). Left open is how to correct this inefficiency. 
Should, for example, the risk be spread across all medical malpractice insurance policyholders? Or 
should the public at large subsidize the behavior through tax subsidies or caps on damages? 
 52 Avraham et al., supra note 45, at 210. For example, policyholders might forego genetic testing 
out of a fear that the test results might lead to higher insurance premiums. Cf. Tabarrok, supra note 
46, at 80 (explaining why people may choose not to get genetic testing even if there is a possibility 
that the information gained could help minimize the risk of future harm). 
 53 For an excellent review of state regulatory efforts in this vein, see Avraham et al., supra note 
45, at 235–40. 
 54 See id. at 241–66. 
 55 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 112–13 
(5th ed. 2012). 
 56 See id. at 113. 
 57 See Avraham et al., supra note 45, at 212. 
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is therefore precluded in rate setting.58 Consideration of preexisting condi-
tions59 and genetic predisposition to certain diseases are explicitly excluded.60 
Further, regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) under the Fair Housing Act61 prohibit a facially neu-
tral practice that “may have a discriminatory effect” in the housing market.62 
HUD has interpreted this to extend to the sale of homeowners insurance.63 
2. Traditional Rate Regulation 
In addition to these limits, most states regulate insurance rates like public 
utilities to make sure that insurance prices are not “excessive, inadequate, or 
unfairly discriminatory.”64 
                                                                                                                           
 58 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) provides a list of factors that 
health insurers can use in setting rates, including tobacco use, age, and geography, but not gender. See 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv) (2018). The law further specifies maximum premium variations 
based on this exclusive set of factors. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(B). 
 59 The Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act of 1996 requires group insurers to meet 
specific exceptions to deny health coverage due to an insured’s preexisting condition and precludes 
consideration of genetic information as a condition. See 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2018). The ACA prohibits 
all health insurers from denying coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions and health status more 
generally. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3 to -4. 
 60 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 instituted general protections for 
individuals from genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). Specifically, feder-
al law now forbids the use of genetic information in determining eligibility for employment and the 
pricing of health insurance. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(c)–(f); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4. 
 61 The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona 
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018). 
 62 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 63 Id. at 11,475. 
 64 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 24, at 111. In the wake of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
Pub L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015)—federal 
legislation leaving insurance regulation to the states—states passed laws to ensure that the insurance 
rates would be regulated by state law. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 24, at 111. Many states 
enacted these regulations to exempt the insurance industry from federal antitrust regulation. See id. 
This particular form of oversight was historically justified by fears that insurance markets were not 
competitive. In the 1800s and early 1900s, regional groups of fire insurers, the precursor to modern-
day property insurers, shared claims data and suggested rates to member insurers. See Daniel Schwarcz, 
Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 941, 953 (2018). Given 
the limits of the data available at the time, this pooling may have been the only way insurers could 
figure out how to appropriately price policies. But states reasonably feared groups becoming similar to 
a “combination of fire insurance companies [that] was exactly like a trust, [and] that there [would be] 
no internal competition among its members,” and insurance companies would charge monopoly pric-
es. Id. (quoting STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPT PRACTICES IN CONNECTION 
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Excessive rates are those that exceed the insurer’s expected losses, ex-
penses, and reasonable profit minus the insurer’s investment income. When an 
insurer’s rates cannot cover its expected future payouts, the rates are inade-
quate. Rates are discriminatory when low-risk policyholders are charged more 
for their policies than their expected losses and high-risk policyholders are 
charged less.65 In other words, the prohibition on discriminatory rates has noth-
ing to do with protected minority groups or suspect classes, but rather with 
cross-subsidization of insurance rates. 
Regulators have good cause to be concerned about excessive and discrim-
inatory rates in a non-competitive market. Economic theory suggests that 
sellers in that market will charge consumers higher prices and price sensitive 
consumers will forego purchasing the good—this is a so-called monopolist 
deadweight loss.66 Moreover, those who need the good or are otherwise price 
insensitive, will buy it, allowing the monopolist to keep the consumer surplus 
from those purchasers (the amount of value the consumer places on the good 
over the competitive price).67 
The justification for continued review of excessive and discriminatory 
rates is unclear. As one scholar has argued, insurers no longer share data to the 
same extent, the market is more competitive, and insurers now explicitly com-
pete on price.68 This competition should eliminate excessive rates and unjusti-
fied cross-subsidization69 and potentially undermines the propriety of rate reg-
ulation.70 
The justification for regulation of inadequate rates is a bit different. With-
out this kind of oversight, unscrupulous, fly-by-night insurers may charge too 
little for their policies, driving insurers that are charging more out of the mar-
ket. Those charging inadequate rates may then not have sufficient capital to 
                                                                                                                           
WITH LEGISLATION, AND THE AFFAIRS OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, OTHER THAN THOSE DOING LIFE 
INSURANCE BUSINESS, ASSEMB. DOC. NO. 30, at 66 (1911)). 
 65 See Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 943; see also PROP. & CAS. MODEL RATING LAW § 5(A)(3) 
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2010), https://www.naic.org/store/free/GDL-1775.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z34R-ERZU] (“Unfair discrimination exists if, after allowing for practical limitations, price differ-
entials fail to reflect equitably the differences in expected losses and expenses.”). 
 66 See Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a Function of Both 
Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 220 (2019). 
 67 See id. at 220–21. 
 68 See Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 945. 
 69 Of course, there will always be some heterogeneity and cross-subsidization in a pool. Risk 
classification is expensive, and insurers cannot perfectly assess any individual’s risk. Cf. Peter 
Siegelman, Information & Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Big Data, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 317, 
325 (2014). But, as noted above, insurers have significant incentives to classify risk as perfectly as 
possible given cost constraints. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. The concern is not mar-
ginal and justifiable cross-subsidization, but something more substantial. 
 70 See Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 945. 
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pay claims when they come due. This goes hand in hand with solvency regula-
tion, which will be discussed more fully below.71 
AI raises new issues about the competitive nature of the markets. Insurers 
are using price discrimination to charge policyholders based on their willing-
ness to pay rather than their riskiness. Price discrimination occurs when sellers 
can determine which of their consumers are sensitive to prices and charge higher 
prices to those willing to pay more.72 Price discrimination should only exist in 
non-competitive markets.73 That AI enables this to happen in consumer lines of 
insurance, which are seemingly competitive markets, raises new concerns. 
B. Regulation of Coverage and Forms 
Because consumers have a difficult time evaluating carriers and the cov-
erage offered, the government regulates insurance coverage in several ways. In 
some circumstances, legislatures mandate a minimum amount of coverage or 
require certain groups to purchase insurance to participate in certain activi-
ties.74 Legislatures and regulators also oversee the content of insurance forms 
for both clarity and the scope of coverage.75 And, of course, courts interpret 
policy language to give effect to the contract and the legislature’s and regula-
tor’s guidance.76 
The conceptual divide between and among these forms of oversight are 
less strict than they might appear on their face. For example, some states pro-
hibit carriers from excluding coverage for innocent co-insureds—that is, the 
carrier must provide coverage for a loss caused intentionally by one of several 
insureds, as when a husband intentionally burns a home jointly owned with a 
wife.77 On the one hand, this might be seen as a regulation of forms because 
the state effectuates its aim through required or prohibited policy language. But 
the prohibition also acts as a means of mandating additional coverage, because 
insurers must offer—and consumers must buy—coverage that they may not 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 72 Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGAN-
IZATION 2221, 2227 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007). 
 73 Id. at 2226 (“It is well known that price discrimination is only feasible under certain conditions: 
(i) firms have short-run market power, (ii) consumers can be segmented either directly or indirectly, 
and (iii) arbitrage across differently priced goods is infeasible.”). 
 74 See infra Part I.B.II. 
 75 See infra Part I.B.I. 
 76 See infra Part I.B.III. 
 77 Some states have mandated such coverage legislatively, see, for example, NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 44-7406(6) (2019); WASH. REV. COD. § 48.18.550 (2019); others through judicial action, see, for 
example, Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 521 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Mich. 1994). For the most 
part, these coverages are seen as a means of protecting women who have been the victims of domestic 
abuse. 
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otherwise. Further, when policies are ambiguous as to whether they provide the 
mandated coverages, courts will interpret the insurance contract consistent 
with the state’s policy aims. 
This Section discusses the government’s regulatory activity and the pur-
pose for that activity. 
1. Policy Forms 
Most states lightly regulate the content and form of insurance policies in 
personal insurance markets. Regulators limit their oversight to guarantee that 
policies are not ambiguous; unreasonable; or against specific state rules, such 
as rules limiting the ability of insurers to object to insured misrepresentation 
after a period of time, requiring insurable interests, or requiring coverage for 
innocent co-insureds.78 This oversight can take several forms, including requir-
ing specific language,79 mandating minimum coverage regardless of policy 
language,80 or prohibiting particular terms. 
This oversight is justified, in part, by information asymmetries between 
insurers and their consumers. Insurers are in a better position to understand the 
implications of language choices in policies. They are repeat players in litiga-
tion that interprets particular clauses, are experts in the forms they write, and it 
is their business to know how often certain kinds of losses occur. In contrast, 
individual policyholders likely have no legal expertise, no experience reading 
and interpreting contract terms, no real experience with coverage and exclu-
sion language, and no way to predict the likelihood of different kinds of losses. 
Regulators can, in theory, protect uneducated consumers from unclear and de-
ceptive policy language. 
This simple justification is not complete. Insurers should be able to out-
compete based on clearer language and a reputation for better coverage. And 
yet, form review—or some minimal form review—continues. This continued 
oversight might be explained away by regulatory inertia—the notion that regu-
lators are unlikely to change the way they oversee the industry unless an exog-
                                                                                                                           
 78 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 24, at 143 (“States often have various other policy form 
requirements—ranging from required coverage for innocent co-insureds to prohibitions on absolute 
pollution exclusions or mandatory arbitration provisions . . . .”). 
 79 For example, many states require that life insurance policies contain language explaining that 
the policy cannot be contested after it has been in force for two years. See id. at 321 (“All life insur-
ance policies issued in this country . . . contain what is known as an ‘incontestability clause.’ Some 
states require that such clauses conform to specified requirements; others do not.”); Robert Works, 
Coverage Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of Post-Claim Underwriting, 1979 U. 
ILL. L.F. 809. 
 80 For example, coverage for innocent co-insureds could be required as a statutory matter regard-
less of policy exclusions. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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enous shock forces change.81 Regulators have always minimally evaluated pol-
icy forms and therefore continue to do so even if it is not strictly necessary. 
There may, however, be another reason for form regulation. It may be that 
individual consumers simply cannot or will not ever fully understand policy 
language. As a result, insurers can narrow coverage and sell products that are 
less complete for their policyholders without negative market reactions. This 
may be true for a number of reasons: because information asymmetries may be 
persistent and difficult to eliminate,82 because individual understanding and 
prediction about risks is poor,83 or because there is no instantaneous feedback 
about the quality of insurance products due to the nature of the good, leading 
to a “lemons” problem.84 
If this is true, some regulatory oversight over policy content is necessary to 
socialize the risks covered (spread the risks to a greater number of people) and 
guarantee the security that insurance promises. Most form review is minimal, at 
best, but even that minimal review ensures that the policies offered to consumers 
are not empty coverage shells. This creates more coverage for more people, thus 
spreading the covered risks more broadly. This additional coverage, in turn, cre-
ates greater security for policyholders in both the objective and subjective sense. 
2. Mandated or Minimum Coverage 
The government also regulates insurance by requiring that consumers 
purchase a minimum amount of coverage to participate in certain activities. 
For example, in almost every state, anyone who registers a motor vehicle must 
obtain a minimum amount of automobile liability insurance,85 and some states 
require professional liability insurance to practice medicine and law.86 Even 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Regulatory inertia refers to the fact that insurance law has “moved forward only under consid-
erable pressure, and then with little conscious planning.” See Kimball, supra note 30, at 476. 
 82 There may be no way to correct the information asymmetries that exist. Policy choices are 
complicated, and it is not clear that policyholders have the experience necessary to differentiate 
among options even if insurers do compete on policy terms and content. 
 83 Potential policyholders might, for example, underestimate the risks that insurance covers, inap-
propriately shop based on prices, or have too little experience with the covered losses and insurance 
practices to make good choices when purchasing insurance. 
 84 If policyholders cannot choose well among a set of insurance options, bad contracts might 
drive out good ones by underpricing them. No matter how one conceptualizes this problem, the result 
would be less coverage overall. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492–93 (1970). 
 85 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 24, at 656; TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 402 (3d ed. 2013). 
 86 Almost all states mandate that doctors have medical malpractice insurance. Michelle M. Mello, 
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 1 (2006). Only Oregon requires 
legal professional liability insurance for all lawyers, but several others require it for lawyers practicing 
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where insurance is not legally required, it is often a practical requirement. For 
example, banks generally require those who obtain home mortgages to pur-
chase a home to also purchase homeowners’ insurance on the property.87 Fur-
ther, states require certain businesses to obtain workers’ compensation insur-
ance to protect employees,88 and the federal and state governments require, 
through payroll taxes, coverage for social insurance programs such as Medi-
care, Social Security, and unemployment insurance.89 
In some instances, states also require minimum dollar values for coverage 
or require specific coverage provisions. These interventions range in intrusive-
ness. On the strong side of the spectrum, for example, are states that require 
high accident limits for auto insurance and the ACA’s requirements that health 
insurance plans cover a wide variety of potential health conditions. On the low 
end of the spectrum, for example, are states that require lower amounts of auto 
coverage or a requirement that policies include relatively minor, but socially 
and politically important provisions, like coverage for innocent co-insureds.90 
These interventions in the insurance market serve a number of ends. At a 
minimum, they create more coverage for more people, thus creating additional 
security and spreading risks more broadly. But these interventions are often 
justified in additional ways. For instance, mandatory auto insurance and the 
concomitant minimum coverage requirement do not really provide security for 
the driver, rather the security extends to auto accident victims.91 Without insur-
ance, most victims of auto accidents would be left without compensation.92 
Thus, auto insurance is justified, in large part, because it serves to protect victims 
of predictable accidents and enables the tort system. Similarly, mandatory mal-
practice insurance can be justified by the remedies it creates for tort victims. 
Further, some mandatory coverage might be justified by societal com-
mitments, because of behavioral errors, or by some crude cost-benefit analysis. 
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Social Security and Medicare, for example, are partially justified because most 
people are not saving adequately for their retirement and citizens do not want 
to live in a society where those beyond working age are left without a means to 
take care of themselves.93 These programs might also be justified because 
some form of income for those beyond working age allows family members to 
avoid the opportunity costs of providing personal care.94 
3. Judicial Regulation 
Courts also play a role in regulating the content of insurance policies. When 
courts interpret policies, they regulate the scope of coverage provided by the 
insurers.95 It is not necessary to go into any real depth about the ways that ambi-
guity can be introduced into a contract, the ways that insurance contracts are in-
terpreted, or the decision-making processes of the courts to understand this vital 
role. In short, courts can interpret phrases in an insurance policy to have a par-
ticular meaning that can define the scope of coverage in a particular way. 
Courts may choose to do so because the insurer is in the best position to 
write a policy clearly,96 because the policyholder might have reasonable expec-
tations of coverage that are undermined by narrowly written contracts,97 or 
because a narrower construction of coverage would create a disproportionate 
forfeiture on the policyholder.98 These rationales are justified, in part, because 
the insurer, which writes the policies, better understands the likelihood of poli-
cyholder loss and is a repeat player in the litigation system. Thus, the insurer 
has a significant informational advantage over the policyholder. 
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Regardless of the justification, these decisions can have a lasting effect on 
coverage beyond the particular parties at suit. These decisions could bind par-
ticular insurers because of res judicata or simply be an important precedent for 
the insurer and other insurers in the market that have the same policy language. 
C. General Oversight of Insurers and Markets 
Regulators also oversee the business practices of insurers to eliminate op-
portunistic behavior. Policyholders pay premiums in advance for a promise of 
future security. The payment-for-future-promise arrangement makes it possible 
for insurers to act in ways that increase their bottom line without fulfilling the 
essential promises of the insurance policy. Regulators watch over how insurers 
market products, price coverage, invest premiums, and handle claims to limit 
this opportunism. 
1. Solvency 
A core function of state insurance regulators is to guarantee the fiscal sta-
bility of insurers. The long-term and contingent promise of insurance is only 
valuable so long as an insurer has the financial wherewithal to make good on 
its promises when claims come due. 
Insurers generate revenue both by taking in money from policy premiums 
and from the investment income on the float—the period of time between tak-
ing in the premiums and paying out the losses. Insurers could make a number 
of decisions that could undermine their financial stability. For example, insur-
ers could charge too little for coverage, spend too much on administrative 
overhead or on advertising to induce new policyholders into the fold, and they 
could purchase speculative or risky investments. 
Policyholders are not, however, best able to identify which insurers make 
risky investments or have risky underwriting practices. First, other than word 
of mouth, there is little that a policyholder can do to evaluate the financial sta-
bility of a potential insurer. It is difficult to get or understand the financials of 
an insurer and unlikely that a long-term policyholder would regularly reevalu-
ate that question at policy renewal. Further, policyholders would only get di-
rect feedback about an insurer’s ability to pay when the policyholder has al-
ready suffered a loss. These events are likely too infrequent to provide neces-
sary feedback to make educated decisions. 
Second, policyholders have little ability to negotiate about management 
or investment strategy with an insurer. Managers and owners of insurance 
companies may have incentives to take on risky management or investment 
practices. But, unlike lenders, who can condition loans on certain investment 
behaviors, policyholders have no ex ante leverage other than rejecting the in-
surance coverage offered. 
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This suggests that there are at least two market failures that justify sol-
vency regulation. First, there is an information gap: policyholders do not know 
and often cannot easily ascertain which insurers are fiscally sound. Second, 
there is an agency problem: managers may act in ways that are not beneficial 
for the policyholders who provide the working capital for the firm.  
Solvency regulation increases the security that insurance provides. By 
guaranteeing that insurers can pay legitimate claims, regulators are further guar-
anteeing that policyholders will obtain the peace of mind they purchased. This, 
in turn, creates a greater level of subjective security for the policyholders.99 
2. Insurance Intermediaries 
Insurers often use intermediaries—brokers or agents—to form a bridge 
between the insurer and the policyholder. Intermediaries can help policyhold-
ers understand confusing policies and multitudinous policy options,100 over-
come biases and heuristics that make insurance buying difficult,101 and level 
information gaps between policyholders and insurers.102 But, intermediaries 
are not equally good at their jobs and do not necessarily have the proper set of 
incentives to do their best for consumers. As with the underlying insurance 
products, consumers are unlikely to have the information or ability to evaluate 
intermediaries.103 Regulators and courts intervene, albeit lightly, to correct 
these market failures. 
Before considering the regulatory response, consider how intermediaries 
may act opportunistically. Some intermediaries may not invest in their own 
education or stay up to date on the latest changes in policies or policy offer-
ings. For others, the compensation structure might encourage intermediaries to 
offer policies that are not as good for the consumer as other available op-
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tions.104 And, even when intermediaries are generally knowledgeable and are 
not unduly influenced by commissions, the time spent learning the specific 
needs of a particular client might be more lucratively spent on marketing and 
obtaining new clients. 
Regulators use licensing and continuing education requirements to ensure 
that intermediaries have a minimum level of competence about which policies 
would work best for which consumers and about developments in the indus-
try.105 Courts reduce opportunism by requiring that intermediaries exercise a 
duty of care as professionals106 and by binding agents through estoppel if an 
agent makes a misstatement on which the policyholder reasonably relies to her 
detriment.107 
But neither the regulatory nor the liability regime are particularly strong 
and are unlikely to have their intended effect on the industry. In most jurisdic-
tions, intermediaries have no duty, absent a special relationship, to advise poli-
cyholders about whether insurance coverage that is available is adequate or 
appropriate to their needs; nor are intermediaries required to provide infor-
mation about alternative policies that might better meet their needs.108 Further, 
most jurisdictions make it quite difficult to create a special relationship. For 
example, in some jurisdictions, it is possible to establish a special relationship 
through a long-term relationship with the intermediary109 or when the interme-
diary specifically agrees to work on particular coverage issues.110 But a general 
request for “the best policy” or “full coverage” does not create “a duty to de-
termine the insured’s full insurance needs, to advise the insured about cover-
age, or to use his discretion and expertise to determine what coverage the in-
sured should purchase.”111 
Thus, although regulators and courts have some role in this sphere, it is 
quite limited. 
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2020] The New Regulatory Imperative for Insurance 2055 
3. Market Conduct 
Regulators and courts also oversee insurance marketing and claims han-
dling. These are moments in the insurance relationship where policyholders are 
particularly vulnerable. Insurance consumers rarely know the exact contours of 
their policies and even less frequently are able to compare similar policies 
across insurers. In many instances, policyholders cannot even see their policies 
before purchasing them. Unscrupulous insurers could take advantage of this 
information gap with false and misleading advertising. Likewise, policyholders 
know very little about the companies’ claims processes or their rights in that 
process.112 Again, insurers can act opportunistically. Insurers may delay paying 
claims, contest claims knowing that some policyholders will abandon their 
claims or accept reduced payments, or deny claims altogether to make money 
on float.113 Every day that the insurers delay paying out on claims, the insurers 
earn interest on the premiums the policyholders have paid. These information 
asymmetries make it difficult for market solutions to solve the inherent prob-
lems, thus necessitating regulatory and judicial intervention. 
Although there is significant variation across the states, regulators are 
generally empowered to curb unfair trade practices. The National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a deeply influential organization of in-
surance commissioners from each of the states,114 has promulgated, and multi-
ple states have adopted, model laws that govern unfair trade practices115 and 
unfair settlement practices.116 Unfair trade practices include false advertising 
of insurance policies, which is defined as “misrepresent[ing] the benefits, ad-
vantages, conditions or terms of any policy.”117 Unfair settlement practices 
include a failure “in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settle-
ment of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear” and 
“[r]efusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation.”118 
State regulators are empowered in most states to require insurers to report data 
on claims, rate of payment, and speed of payment. From this, regulators can 
identify those companies that do not seem to be paying claims at a reasonable 
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rate or in a timely manner. Regulators also collect data about consumer com-
plaints and rates of renewal.119 This data, however, is not made publicly avail-
able. State regulators can also bring enforcement actions, but these actions are 
largely toothless because the standard for finding a violation is too high and 
the fines are too small to be meaningful.120 
Courts also help curb opportunism in market conduct settings. First, as 
described above, courts have several mechanisms to help control potentially 
false advertising by insurers and intermediaries: policyholders, who rely on 
false claims by insurers or intermediaries, may have tort claims for breach of 
duty and insurers may be estopped from denying coverage.121 On the back end 
of the relationship, courts regulate insurer claims practices with a variety of 
liability rules aimed at providing a remedy for failure to pay claims in a rea-
sonable manner.122 These claims are often difficult to prove and under-
compensatory, but may provide some bulwark against the most egregious mar-
ket behaviors.123  
* * * * * 
Although this is not a full accounting of the reasons for insurance regula-
tion or the failures of the market, this Part provides some idea of both the hows 
and the whys of regulation. The problem is that the mechanisms regulators use to 
protect the market and the values of the insurance system are based on the histor-
ical practices of insurers. Using AI and big data, insurers are revolutionizing 
their business practices—finding new ways to price risks and policies, tailor 
coverage, offer advice to purchasers, identify fraud, and sequence the payment 
of claims. These changes throughout the life cycle of insurance have subverted 
the protections for consumers built into the current regulatory regimes.  
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II. INDIVIDUATED PRICES 
Insurers can use AI to tailor prices in two ways. First, AI can help insurers 
find new correlations to loss that help the insurer sort policyholders into more 
homogeneous groups. By classifying risks more finely, insurers can better 
price their products for low- and high-risk policyholders. As with other types 
of risk classification, pricing with AI raises concerns about burdening vulnera-
ble groups with higher prices, invasions of privacy, and social costs.124 But the 
use of AI to price risks puts those concerns in a new light and raises new con-
cerns such as the ownership of data that the insurers use to price risks. Regula-
tors must adapt to continue to protect vulnerable groups, policyholder privacy, 
and policyholders’ interest in their data. 
Second, insurers can tailor prices not based on the level of risk that the 
policyholder represents but based on the individual’s willingness to pay. Set-
ting prices in this way ignores traditional prohibitions against “discriminatory” 
pricing—pricing that requires cross-subsidization from low-risk to high-risk in-
sureds. Regulators must determine whether to continue to pursue this traditional 
form of regulation. To do so, regulators should consider whether and how this 
practice is harming consumers. This Part addresses these issues in turn. 
A. AI Stretches Consumer Protections in Risk Classification 
Insurance prices are based on the risk that an insured will suffer a loss in 
the policy period and the likely size of that loss. That determination is inher-
ently data-driven. For example, to price a particular applicant’s policy, insurers 
need data on losses in the population at large, on claimants generally, and on 
the particular applicant. 
In traditional statistical analyses of risk, insurers first identify a set of in-
dependent variables presumably with the power to predict loss. The insurers 
can then compare those variables to past loss experiences to set the prices. For 
example, traditional underwriting of homeowners insurance likely begins with 
the age of the house, the kind of materials used, the distance from a fire sta-
tion, the smoking status of the residents, etc., because these variables have 
been used in the past and shown to correlate to loss. 
AI, fueled by big data, provides an opportunity to enhance and refine insur-
ers’ underwriting. With AI, insurers can search through more data without the 
restriction of identifying particular potential correlations to loss ex ante. Instead, 
the AI could consider vast amounts of data—including things that seemingly 
should have no correlation to insurable events, like property losses and things 
such as tweets, likes on Facebook, Google searches, online shopping patterns, 
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etc.—and run an iterative process to identify correlations to loss. When pro-
grammed to price risk, the AI will sift through this information, adapting and 
refining the weight it puts on each factor until it finds new and better ways to 
score the likelihood that a policyholder will suffer a relevant loss in a particular 
period. This iterative and somewhat unsupervised process has significant impli-
cations for fairness, for privacy, and for corporate control of consumer data.  
1. Protecting Vulnerable Groups and the Limits of Risk Classification 
The iterative, unsupervised analysis used by AI to price insurance policies 
may undermine the limited state and federal protections that exist to protect 
vulnerable groups and suspect classes from higher prices. If AI uses hundreds 
or thousands of individual data points to set the price, the AI may charge vul-
nerable groups more for the same coverage, even if data scientists prohibit the 
use of some variables—for example, race, gender, religion, country of origin, 
etc. in the pricing algorithm. 
Imagine first that there is, in fact, a correlation between a suspect group 
and loss. Imagine further that state regulators have prohibited the use of the 
suspect group in risk classification. Even if told not to use a particular set of 
forbidden variables, the AI might, in the first instance, use obvious proxies for 
prohibited categories—like zip code and race. This too could presumably be 
rooted out by expanding the list of prohibited categories from the AI’s pricing 
model. But, even so, the AI might hit upon non-obvious proxies for prohibited 
categories. In that situation, even if one unpacked the algorithms ex post to 
determine what variables it used, simply peering through the list would not 
make clear whether some groups are inadvertently being charged more for in-
surance. More concernedly, it is likely that no one variable is a proxy for the 
prohibited category. Instead, it may be that the AI will hit upon a set of varia-
bles that correlate with prohibited categories in ways that could be impenetra-
ble.125 This would result in higher prices for vulnerable groups. Even if these 
higher prices do not carry the expressive harms of intentional discrimina-
tion,126 they nonetheless may make more expensive ordinary activities like 
driving, homeownership, and providing security for one’s family through life, 
disability, or health insurance. This raises significant fairness concerns. 
As discussed above, there are multiple competing conceptions of fairness 
in insurance pricing. Fairness might be associated with pricing based on indi-
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vidualized risk of loss or associated with a pricing scheme that considers the 
context and characteristics that make up the individual’s risk profile. In differ-
ent lines of insurance, different notions about what is “fair” might carry the 
day. Some higher rates on some vulnerable groups may be more tolerable than 
others. Even without AI complicating the issues and even assuming away dis-
crimination based on animus, some groups will always pay more for the same 
product than other groups. 
For example, older people pay more for life insurance than younger peo-
ple. Even if this price were based on facially neutral characteristics—that is, 
even if the price were based on something other than the age of the in-
sured127—these higher rates seem normatively defensible. There is little doubt 
that, on average, older people are more likely to die in the policy period—say 
the next year—than younger people. Thus, insurers face a higher risk of paying 
out in the policy period for the elderly than for the young. These higher prices 
thus seem defensible even though age is not something people can control in 
light of the strength of the causal story and the role that life insurance plays in 
the security of younger and older policyholders. Younger policyholders use life 
insurance to hedge the risk of death and the concomitant loss of earnings. Old-
er policyholders have had more time to save and lost earnings might not be as 
economically disruptive. 
Consider instead homeowners insurance and crime. Property insurers 
could base rates on crime statistics. People who live in areas with higher crime 
rates may have to pay more for homeowners insurance than those who live in 
low-crime areas. This makes some sense statistically. If there is a high risk of 
loss due to theft or other criminal activity, insurers might feel justified in 
charging more for the insurance as their risk of paying out on the policy is cor-
respondingly higher.  
Now imagine that there is a correlation between crime rates and a protect-
ed class—like race, religion, or national origin.128 The higher rates now create 
a disparate impact on certain groups. There are strong arguments on both sides 
about whether these higher rates are normatively defensible. The higher rates 
might be fair to homeowners in low-crime areas who would otherwise have to 
subsidize the insurance premiums of those in high-crime areas. Higher rates 
might also control against adverse selection—to the extent that homeowners 
insurance is not de facto mandatory—or encourage efforts to mitigate loss, like 
community policing. On the other hand, homeowners insurance serves im-
portant social functions. As with other types of insurance, it creates a sense of 
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economic security that might increase policyholder wellbeing, and it provides 
some financial security for policyholders.129 Homeowners insurance also low-
ers the lending rate by securing the primary collateral for the mortgage—the 
home. Higher rates in this context, even if statistically defensible, look more 
problematic, because there may be historical and sociological reasons for high-
er crime in particular areas. Further, insureds who live in high-crime areas may 
not have the means to move. Under this view, cross-subsidization from low-
risk policyholders to high-risk ones is more justified, as the high-risk charac-
teristic may not be deserved. And to the extent that areas of high crime are 
predominately made up of people of color, there may be a risk that the higher 
premiums reinforce negative stereotypes and impose dignitary harms.130 
Next, consider health insurance. In a world without the ACA controlling 
rates in the non-employer market, prices for women in their twenties and thir-
ties might spike. Pregnancy and childbirth are high-cost events that increase 
the insurers’ risk of paying out. But charging all of that increased risk of health 
care spending to women alone seems unreasonable because both men and 
women are part of the child-making process (even in the case of assisted re-
production), and because society seems to put a significant value on children 
(if not child-rearing). 
These complexities suggest that there are not easy heuristics for regula-
tors. Deciding how and when to regulate insurance pricing will require signifi-
cant and nuanced thinking. As a final step, regulators should focus on the dispar-
ate impact that facially neutral rates have on vulnerable groups instead of focus-
ing on prohibiting intentional discrimination.131 But, in doing so, regulators must 
recognize that this is a complicated issue. Whether disparate impact matters de-
pends on a careful consideration of factors that roughly cluster around argu-
ments based on efficiency and fairness. This observation is consistent with the 
findings from Ronen Avraham, Kyle Logue, and Daniel Schwarcz.132 They 
show that states have different approaches to banning intentional discrimina-
tion across lines of insurance and jurisdictions.133 In part, these inconsistencies 
might be based on lobbying from insurers or low-risk groups of consumers. 
But these differences might also reflect the reasoned judgment of policy-
makers and real concerns about setting rates that are fair to low-risk policy-
holders, protect against adverse selection, and help mitigate moral hazard. 
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Whether this potential disparate impact matters depends on the line of in-
surance, the potential causal story, and the social importance of the line of in-
surance. These considerations must come to the fore in the age of AI to restore 
the protections promised by the state. To begin this conversation, regulators 
must enable insurers to gather relevant data about pricing and race. They 
should then make that information available to the public so that sophisticated 
researchers can evaluate whether vulnerable groups are paying more for cer-
tain lines of insurance. This will not answer the question about whether the 
higher prices are justifiable, but it will begin the complicated conversations 
that are necessary to answer that question. 
2. Privacy 
Scholars and advocates have long argued that there should be some catego-
ries of personal information beyond the reach of insurers. According to this ar-
gument, categories like genetic information, sexual orientation, or HIV status are 
so closely held and so intimate that states should bar insurers from using the in-
formation in setting rates or deciding whether to issue a policy.134 And, some 
states have enacted modest privacy protections in response, such as prohibiting 
insurers from asking applicants about certain personal, private characteristics. 
The privacy debates tend to mirror the concerns raised in any debate about 
risk classification, raising issues of both efficiency and fairness. If insurers can 
access the information, they can price policies more precisely. If not, insurers 
will charge everyone a higher premium, because some unidentifiable individuals 
in the population have a higher risk of loss. This raises concerns about adverse 
selection—the fear that better-risk policyholders will drop out of the pool in light 
of the higher prices. But, requiring disclosure of certain information could mean 
that some people avoid acquiring the private information. 
For example, if insurers are not permitted to consider genetic information 
in pricing life insurance, they will have to raise the rates for all policyholders 
to cover the cost of paying out for individuals who have predictably shorter life 
expectancies as a result of known genetic disorders. This might make life in-
surance too expensive for those without the predisposition to disease, leading 
to adverse selection.135 On the other hand, if insurers consider such infor-
mation in risk classification, some people might forego getting genetic testing 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See Anya E.R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational 
Discrimination Policy Rational?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 624, 661–63 (2018); Sandra Elizabeth Stone, Note, 
HIV Testing and Insurance Applicants: Exploring Constitutional Alternatives to Statutory Protections, 
19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1163, 1164 (1992). 
 135 See Siegelman, supra note 9, at 1223–24.  
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and thus miss out on timely medical interventions.136 Additionally, privacy 
scholars argue that some set of private, intimate information should simply be 
beyond the scope of corporate view.137 
The advent of AI does not change these baseline arguments, but AI might 
allow insurers a way around existing state privacy regulations. Insurers have 
typically relied primarily on insurance applications as a method of gathering 
data on applicants. To the extent they wanted to do more, they were likely lim-
ited by cost—background checks and other investigations are expensive. With 
AI, it may be easier to learn more about an applicant at lower costs. 
For example, insurers could buy or harvest data that could include other-
wise private information. Data brokers can obtain data from a wide range of 
places, including health records; online transactions; or other activities of daily 
living, such as meta-data from email and texts, search queries from a myriad of 
sites like Google and YouTube, social media interactions, cell site location in-
formation, books and articles kept and read on cloud-based servers, and infor-
mation from telematics devices in cars.138 Further, AI might be able to predict 
individual characteristics even if insurers cannot ask about them. For example, 
buying a book on a genetic disorder or liking a disease foundation’s Facebook 
page might reveal something about an individual’s pre-disposition to dis-
ease.139 Likewise, social media habits could reveal something about a person’s 
sexual orientation or HIV status. Also, given the ease with which companies 
gather data, they may be able use pieces of information that regulators did not 
consider as they set their baseline for privacy. Policyholder lives are thus more 
exposed to an underwriting eye. 
This suggests that AI could allow insurers to intentionally or unintention-
ally make an end-run around privacy protections. Regulators must consider 
whether and how much to limit these practices. As with concerns about bur-
dens on vulnerable groups, regulators may need to find ways to ensure that the 
protections exist against unintentional invasions.  
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Tabarrok, supra note 46, at 80. 
 137 See Prince, supra note 134, at 625–26; Stone, supra note 134, at 1177–78. 
 138 Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 
MAG. 509, 509 (2015); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 240. 
 139 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 97–98 (2014). In one apocryphal story, Target correct-
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amount of data insurers have and can purchase about their customers. Id. at 94–95, 98–99; see Colin 
Fraser, Target Didn’t Figure Out a Teenager Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, and That One 
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fraser/target-didnt-figure-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did-a6be13b973a5 [https://
perma.cc/XE5S-87MA]. 
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3. Ownership of Data 
Increasingly insurers are relying on devices that track policyholder behav-
ior to price risk. For example, auto insurers now routinely ask policyholders to 
put electronic devices called telematics devices into their cars to monitor their 
driving patterns.140 With these devices, insurers can better price risks by directly 
measuring their policyholders’ driving habits, including distance driven, how fast 
they drive, how hard they brake, and times of day they are in the car.141 It is not 
hard, given the burgeoning interconnectivity of mundane, household objects 
like dishwashers, refrigerators, heating and cooling systems, and washing ma-
chines, to imagine that insurers could expand their data-gathering experiment 
into new lines. An insurer could find ways to harness information from these 
household objects to assess potential losses in a house. Similarly, a life insurer 
could use information gathered from smartphones, wearable health devices, or 
credit card statements to assess how often one exercises, goes to the gym, or 
purchases healthy foods to assess life expectancy.142 
There are likely coming battles about who owns the data contained on 
these devices. In these examples, the policyholder is generating the data kept 
inside the device and policyholders might want some sort of control over what 
happens to that data. For example, if a good driver wants to switch carriers, 
can she take the information from her telematics device to the new carrier and 
demand a lower rate? Can a bad driver prohibit his current carrier from sharing 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Allstate explains how this works on its website: “Telematics is a method used to collect in-
formation about your driving habits. . . . [I]t may record the number of miles you drive, your speed, 
and how quickly you brake. These systems may also analyze the time of day when you drive.” How 
Telematics May Affect Your Car Insurance, ALLSTATE, https://www.allstate.com/tr/car-insurance/
telematics-device.aspx [https://perma.cc/35SQ-PG6E]. At least one insurer requires its insureds to use 
telematics devices—Metromile explicitly charges users for auto insurance by the number of miles 
driven. See METROMILE, https://www.metromile.com [https://perma.cc/EC8J-GTUA]. To capture that 
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Pulse Device, METROMILE, https://www.metromile.com/terms-conditions-pulse-device/ [https://perma.
cc/3PB4-XUZQ]. 
 141 Drivers who break harder, drive faster, drive during particular times of day, and drive more 
miles are more likely to get into accidents. Those who do not are less of a risk and can be charged less 
for coverage. 
 142 For example, an electric toothbrush company recently bought a dental insurance company. See 
Angelica LaVito, A Toothbrush Start-Up Buys an Insurer so It Can Cover Your Dental Visits, Too, 
CNBC (May 16, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/quip-toothbrush-startup-acquires-afora-
dental-insurance-startup.html [https://perma.cc/VGD9-ME9F]. It is not hard to see the linkage be-
tween information an electric toothbrush might have about its user and the risk of loss under a dental 
policy. 
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that information with a new insurer?143 If insurers own the data, it may make it 
more difficult to switch carriers, which raises additional concerns that insurers 
will charge their policyholders monopoly rates because the best insureds would 
have a hard time getting better rates without their data. 
This may seem to be a minor concern, but as more companies rely on data 
that the policyholder generates to price risk, the concern is growing. And, regu-
lators should begin to consider the implications of user-generated data. 
B. Price Discrimination 
Insurers are not just tailoring prices more finely to match a policyholder’s 
risk profile; they are using AI to match prices to a consumer’s willingness to 
pay.144 This means that policyholders that represent the same risk of loss could 
pay different prices for the same coverage.145 This price discrimination,146 eu-
phemistically called price-optimization by insurers, intersects with regulations 
protecting policyholders from excessive and discriminatory pricing, ensuring 
that low-risk policyholders do not subsidize high-risk policyholders and thus 
pay too much for coverage.147 
Price discrimination is being debated in a number of fora. The NAIC is ac-
tively considering whether and how to provide guidance on the practice of price 
discrimination.148 A number of states have banned or limited price discrimina-
                                                                                                                           
 143 This might create something akin to a market for lemons. Carriers would assume that new 
applicants who do not have information from a telematics device are all bad risks because they cannot 
differentiate between those who never used telematics devices and those who have bad driving habits. 
 144 According to an industry survey in 2014 by Willis Towers Watson, about one-third of auto 
insurance carriers are using some form of price discrimination. See Towers Watson, Insurers Say 
Predictive Modeling Is Boosting Their Profits, KOREA BIZWIRE (Feb. 9, 2015), http://koreabizwire.
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 145 Andrea Wells, The Price of Price Optimization, INS. J. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.insurance
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 146 Price discrimination exists when the prices consumers pay vary in ways that cannot be ex-
plained by differences in the marginal cost of the product or service. In the context of insurance, this 
means pricing a policy on something other than the policyholder’s features and experiences that corre-
late with a risk of loss. See Stole, supra note 72, at 2224. Price discrimination exploits the elasticity of 
demand by charging a higher price to consumers who are willing and able to pay more for a particular 
line of insurance. See id. 
 147 See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 148 See generally CAS. ACTUARIAL & STATISTICAL (C) TASK FORCE, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, PRICE OPTIMIZATION WHITE PAPER (2015), https://www.naic.org/documents/committees_
c_catf_related_price_optimization_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX5M-JCUR] (discussing the 
pros and cons of using price optimization and options for state regulatory responses to its uses). 
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tion in insurance149 and there are active lawsuits about whether insurers should 
be allowed to use price discrimination in setting rates.150 This fight is about 
both the role regulators have in setting rates for insurance generally and the 
propriety of AI-enhanced bespoke pricing. 
This Section first discusses how AI enhances the precision of price discrim-
ination.151 It then considers whether regulators should care, especially consider-
ing recent calls to eliminate traditional rate regulation in competitive markets.152 
1. Insurers and Price Discrimination 
Insurers have long varied prices to some extent within risk categories.153 
For example, insurers regularly give multi-line discounts (discounts for poli-
cyholders that purchase more than one line of insurance from the insurer),154 
provide discounts for young drivers to keep their parents as customers,155 and 
provide short-term price cuts to induce new policyholders to become custom-
ers.156 In each of these examples, insurers price their products on something 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Susan Kearney, Price Optimization: Big Data Boon or Unfair Practice? You Decide, PROP. 
CASUALTY 360 (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2017/02/01/price-optimization-
big-data-boon-or-unfair-practic/ [https://perma.cc/32W9-J4E6] (“As of May 2016, notices that limit or 
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REP. (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/carinsurance/price-optimization-car-
insurance-schmo [https://perma.cc/LT8W-DSVS] (listing nine states plus D.C. as limiting or banning 
price optimization). 
 150 See generally Kearney, supra note 149 (discussing two lawsuits challenging insurers’ use of 
price optimization). 
 151 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 152 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 153 This is not unique to insurance. In a variety of contexts, consumers pay different prices for the 
same product: hotels often charge business travelers more for rooms than they charge other travelers; 
airlines vary the price of a ticket based on the day of purchase, with prices often fluctuating by hun-
dreds of dollars; and cable companies regularly provide discounts to customers who complain about 
the price. 
 154 See, e.g., Multiple Policy Discounts, ALLSTATE, https://www.allstate.com/auto-insurance/auto-
life-discounts.aspx [https://perma.cc/7FFC-7QEX]; Multi-Policy Discount, NATIONWIDE, https://www.
nationwide.com/personal/insurance/auto/discounts/types/multi-policy [https://perma.cc/CRQ3-69C5]. 
 155 Robert P. Hartwig, President, Ins. Info. Inst., Testimony at the National Conference of Insur-
ance Legislators: Price Optimization in Auto Insurance Markets: Actuarial, Economic and Regulatory 
Considerations 6 (July 15, 2015), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/ncoiltestimony-
071715.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4WU-H42R] (“Many companies . . . know that the decision to renew a 
policy lies not with the teen driver but with the parent. They do not want to lose the parent as a cus-
tomer, so the youthful driver pays less than he or she should in a strict actuarial-based pricing 
world.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 149. 
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other than the risk that the policyholder presents.157 This type of price discrim-
ination is a relatively crude tool. With AI leading the way, however, sellers can 
now pinpoint their pricing on a truly individual level.158 
In other markets, sellers use a variety of data to set prices, “including con-
sumers’ location, the time of day, the characteristics of their computer (for ex-
ample, operating system and browser),” purchasing history, and likelihood of 
comparison shopping.159 For example, “Uber calculates riders’ propensity for 
paying a higher price for a particular route at a certain time of day . . . . 
[S]omeone traveling from a wealthy neighborhood to another tony spot might be 
asked to pay more than another person heading to a poorer part of town, even if 
demand, traffic and distance are the same.”160 Staples offered discounts based on 
whether rival stores are within twenty miles of its customers’ locations.161 In 
addition, airlines regularly charge higher prices to those who have already 
searched for flights based on computer cookies.162 One relatively recent study 
found evidence of price discrimination in four major retailers and five travel 
sites, including “cases where sites altered prices by hundreds of dollars.”163 
Insurers can likewise use artificial intelligence to identify consumers’ 
price sensitivity and willingness-to-pay. In fact, the long-term nature of insur-
ance contracts makes it easy for insurers to gather data on purchasing habits 
and vary prices accordingly. Insurers often have years and years of data about 
                                                                                                                           
 157 To some extent, insurers may justify the difference between a policyholder’s risk profile and 
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the policyholder’s premium payments and complaints (or lack thereof) about 
prices. If a consumer has searched for insurance prices or is known to compar-
ison shop, insurers can lower prices; conversely, insurers can charge more to 
policyholders who have stayed with the same carrier for a long time without 
complaining about price.164 
Imagine two drivers, A and B, each of whom represents the same risk of a 
car accident in the next year, who are both up for renewal of their insurance 
policy. Driver A has been a customer for ten years and has never called the 
company or complained about the price he pays. Driver B has been a customer 
for the same ten years but is known to be an active comparison shopper. Driver 
B has called the carrier multiple times to complain about prices and has threat-
ened to switch carriers over the years. An insurer using price discrimination 
might charge Driver B less for coverage.165 According to a report by National 
Public Radio, this can result in as much as a thirty-percent change in the prices 
charged to policyholders.166 Whether regulators should limit or ban this prac-
tice depends on whether and how price discrimination harms consumers. 
2. Price Discrimination and Regulatory Puzzles 
Insurers argue that they have always been given some flexibility in pric-
ing for marketing and to provide continuity of coverage for their customers.167 
The Insurance Information Institute (III), a large insurance trade association, 
argues that price discrimination as deployed by the insurance industry is just a 
natural extension of earlier marketing campaigns, like providing lower rates to 
young drivers or new policyholders.168 And, according to the III, given that 
most personal lines of insurance, like homeowners and auto insurance, are 
competitive markets, price discrimination should not hurt consumers.169 
Consumer protection advocates, on the other hand, point out that the es-
sence of price discrimination runs afoul of current regulatory regimes.170 If 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 149. 
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price discrimination requires pricing based on something other than the riski-
ness of an individual and the administrative costs of providing insurance, then 
the rate is by definition excessive and discriminatory. It is excessive because it 
does not reflect the insurer’s expected costs, and it is discriminatory because, if 
one policyholder is paying less than an actuarially fair rate, another must be 
paying more to provide the necessary subsidy.171 
These arguments present significant puzzles for regulators. Insurers claim 
that the marketplaces are competitive and therefore there is no need for any rate 
regulation. This is puzzling because price discrimination should not exist in a 
competitive market;172 consumers who are charged more should simply switch 
to a competitor’s lower-priced product.173 Conversely, consumer advocates argue 
that regulators should monitor and eliminate price discrimination.174 This too 
requires thought. Why should insurance regulators worry about price discrimina-
tion in insurance markets while the practice is largely ignored in other markets 
(like cable services, cellular data plans, and hotel and airline prices)? 
The answer to these puzzles may lie in the role insurance plays in society, 
the nature of insurance contracts, behavioral barriers to switching coverage, 
and the amount of data that insurers have about consumers. As described 
above, insurance plays important roles in society. Insurance is all but mandato-
ry for home ownership and driving. Moreover, insurance does not just redound 
to the benefit of the policyholder. Homeowners insurance secures the policy-
holder, but more importantly provides security for the mortgagor, reducing the 
cost of lending. Auto insurance provides financial protection to the policyhold-
er, but is also an easily-recoverable asset for victims of accidents. Life insur-
ance is not for the benefit of the policyholder, it provides security for the poli-
cyholder’s beneficiaries. In short, insurance is distinct from cable television 
and cellular data because of the role it plays in society. 
Even if there are numerous insurers in the marketplace and cheaper op-
tions available, many policyholders stick with their insurers year after year. For 
example, according to a survey conducted by Consumer Reports, only nine 
percent of homeowners changed insurers in the preceding three years.175 This 
suggests that, despite competitive markets, there may be behavioral barriers to 
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switching, including anxiety about long-term decision making and beliefs 
about the cost of investigating new carriers and switching from one to another. 
Further, price discrimination allows insurers to take the consumer sur-
plus—the difference between the amount a consumer is willing to pay and the 
amount the insurer would charge in a competitive market.176 In this context, if 
consumers prefer to stay with their carrier because they really value the partic-
ular insurer more than competitive prices, or because they view the cost of 
switching as too high, then price discrimination is not inefficient. But it does 
represent a significant transfer of wealth from consumer to producer.177 These 
fears increase when insurers use AI to price discriminate because AI provides 
the potential for a more individually calibrated price discrimination. Insurers 
have long-term information about each policyholder from the relationship they 
have built over the period of coverage. Insurers likely know and can predict 
how price sensitive a particular policyholder is because they know whether and 
how often a policyholder has switched carriers in the past, and whether and 
how often a given policyholder has complained about rates. With this in-
creased ability to individuate, insurers can keep more of the consumer surplus. 
Again, these are real problems in other consumer markets, which are not 
regulated. Regulators should be hesitant to continue regulating excessive and 
discriminatory rates because it is what they have done for decades. There 
might, however, be some continued justification for banning price discrimina-
tion. Although this newfound, more-precise price discrimination is part of a 
long tradition of rates that are not strictly based on a policyholder’s riskiness, 
AI-driven price discrimination aided by the reams of data gathered by carriers 
is a significant refinement of past crude practices. It is not just marketing to 
new consumers or keeping parents happy as teen drivers are added to auto 
coverage. Insurers can individuate prices to such an extent that they capture 
most of the consumer surplus. This harm suggests the kind of anti-competitive 
behavior that rate regulation was initially meant to curtail. 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Bar-Gill, supra note 66, at 220. In a competitive market, some buyers are able to purchase 
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2070 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2031 
III. INDIVIDUATED POLICIES 
Insurance startups are considering ways to customize policies and cover-
ages to individual policyholders. For example, Sherpa, a British company, 
promises to sell new insurance policies tailored to each policyholder’s individ-
ual needs with coverages that react dynamically to different life activities.178 
Although these promises have not yet been realized, Sherpa is a harbinger of 
future AI-based insurance. This Article uses Sherpa’s promises as a case study 
and a warning for regulators to get out in front of challenges for the regulation 
of coverage and forms that have yet to fully materialize. 
Sherpa eschews “[o]ff the shelf insurance policies” in favor of “[t]ailored 
protection around you and your lifestyle.”179 It touts an artificial intelligence, 
called “The Brain,” that “evaluates you on a human level, understands your 
risks, your lifestyle, and your requirements, and recommends you the right 
amount of protection.”180 The founder of the company, Chris Kaye, explains that 
Sherpa provides “a single underwriting process that treats [customers] like a 
human being rather than a statistic, and the ability to get covered at the click of a 
button. No more insurance companies. Effortless, personalised insurance.”181 
Sherpa does so, according to Kaye, by using “a totally new way of underwriting 
(underwriting a person holistically rather than as a series of products).”182 
Sherpa further promises that it will soon be able to gather and use data 
from a policyholder’s smartphone to turn coverage on and off dynamically as 
needed. This futuristic, dynamic coverage suggests fully customizable terms 
that adapt to a policyholder’s needs in real-time and over time. In theory, this 
could save policyholders money and cover more risks. Auto insurance could be 
individually keyed to the times when a policyholder drives, turning coverage 
on only when the policyholder actually gets in a car.183 It could keep certain 
coverages in reserve, like travel insurance, that could automatically kick in 
when the policyholder starts a vacation. In theory, this could lower the price on 
some coverages by turning them off when unused. It could also provide more 
coverage by allowing policyholders to pre-commit to certain types of coverage 
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that they might not otherwise purchase, knowing that it will only kick in when 
needed, or buy a greater level of coverage because they are saving money 
elsewhere. 
Of course, not all of these claims should be taken at face value. This is as 
much a marketing plan as a business model at this point. For example, Sherpa 
is not actually creating new types of coverage. In fact, Sherpa is not even an 
insurer. It is an insurance intermediary, a company that sells insurance provid-
ed by another company. Sherpa’s business model is to act as a wallet for its 
customers, holding several different types of coverage—homeowners, life, auto, 
disability—in one account so that consumers have one point of access for their 
insurance needs.184 The underwriting might inform what coverages to purchase, 
but those coverages seem to be from traditional insurers. Sherpa charges its cus-
tomers a monthly fee to have the Sherpa service, rather than take commissions 
on the policies they sell.185 Further, at this point, Sherpa does not have the ability 
to turn coverages on and off in a dynamic manner. Customers may have some 
ability to modify coverages, but it is neither proactive nor automatic. 
That said, even if Sherpa is currently only offering a new way to purchase 
more traditional coverages, it could be a sign of things to come. Individualized 
and dynamic insurance threatens the consumer protections built into form reg-
ulation. Traditional policy review, although limited in scope, protects consum-
ers in important ways. First, form regulation ensures that certain coverages are 
built into the policies.186 If start-ups are able to avoid form review by tailoring 
policies individually, they could leave out these promised protections in favor 
of cost savings. Second, standardized coverages are well-known to courts. Dy-
namic policies might have new policy language that will be interpreted more 
narrowly in litigation. Third, form regulation creates some standardization.187 
Although not complete, standardization makes it easier for consumers to com-
pare complex insurance products. If policies are truly individuated, consumers 
will have a very difficult time comparing coverages and prices. 
The market is unlikely to sort this problem efficiently. In addition to the 
biases and heuristics that make it difficult to purchase the correct coverage,188 
the time lag between purchase and loss often means that there is no immediate 
feedback about the quality of the insurance product purchased. If this is for 
something small, like bicycle theft coverage or extended warranties on durable 
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goods, regulators might have little incentive to investigate.189 But policies that 
ostensibly cover homes, lives, and driving are big-ticket items. If this coverage 
is less than complete because some AI decided to narrow or eliminate cover-
age, regulators will have to step into the breach. In doing so, regulators will 
have to build capacity to evaluate the types of insurance that should be sold, 
the types of coverages offered, and the algorithm that matches individuals to a 
particular set of policy options. 
IV. AI IN THE MARKETPLACE 
Insurers are also using AI to help consumers pick policies and to identify 
consumer fraud. In the purchasing process, AI replaces human agents and bro-
kers to help consumers choose carriers or choose among policy options. If de-
signed well, these bots could eliminate some of the agency costs associated with 
insurance intermediaries. But, as with other issues in the realm of insurance and 
AI, these bots might mean new risks and new responsibilities for regulators.190 
Insurers are also using AI to help root out fraud in the application and 
claims processes. AI can be used on the front end of the insurance relationship 
to analyze the statements that policyholders make and help determine the 
probability that statements in the application are misleading, and are therefore 
leading insurers to misprice policies. At the back end, in the claims process, AI 
can be used to determine which claims should be paid first and which should 
be investigated further for fraud. The concern in this context is that insurers 
will delay or deny payments in a way that inappropriately burdens policyhold-
ers. Regulators should shift some of their attention from their traditional man-
dates to address the new concerns raised by AI.191 
A. Robo-Advisers 
A number of insurers and intermediaries claim to be using AI to help con-
sumers select among insurers and policy options.192 Lemonade, for example, 
which provides homeowners insurance, advertises that “Maya, our charming 
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artificial intelligence bot, will craft the perfect insurance for you.”193 Clearcov-
er, an auto insurance startup in California, announced its launch with a blog 
post claiming that it was going to lower costs for its customers by using “smart 
technology like artificial intelligence to provide clear, actionable options so 
you’re empowered to make the right coverage choices.”194 AI in this domain is 
replacing the role formerly filled by human insurance advisors—agents and 
brokers. The AI helps consumers select among a menu of potential options to 
find the policy that best fits the consumer’s needs. Having AI replace humans 
makes some sense in this context given that “even simple algorithms often do 
better than ‘experts’ at making predictions across a wide variety of fields.”195 
These companies, and many others, are deploying AI in two different 
stages. First, AI determines what combination of policy options best matches 
with particular types of policyholders. At this stage, the AI sifts through data to 
identify categories of policyholders; identifies the likely risk of loss, types of 
loss, and amount of loss for each particular category; and then matches that 
category to a particular set of policy options that best meets the category’s 
coverage needs. As in other areas discussed above, AI can identify the particu-
lar coverages or coverage amounts that would minimize the financial exposure 
for each category of policyholder. At a second stage, the AI matches the partic-
ular applicant to the categories of policyholders identified in the first stage.196 
This second stage is a less complex matching problem, which simply finds the 
appropriate correlations between the particular policyholder and the broad cat-
egories created in stage one. As a simple example, at the first stage, an AI 
might determine that high-net-worth individuals with high risk aversion (Cate-
gory A) might need a coverage of type X and amount Y. At the second stage, 
some simple algorithm only has to determine whether the particular applicant 
is wealthy enough and has enough risk aversion to be in Category A and then 
suggest coverage X in amount Y. 
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There is currently no regulatory oversight of insurance robo-advisors. As 
described above, most regulation of human intermediaries is in the form of 
education, licensing, and weak liability rules.197 The licensing and continuing 
education requirements are supposed to ensure that intermediaries have a min-
imum level of competence about which policies would work best for which 
consumers and about developments in the industry.198 There is no analogous 
requirement for robo-advisors. This means that no one is monitoring whether 
an AI provides good advice in the first instance, and whether the advice is up-
dated as policies, liability, and the regulatory context change. 
Nor are liability rules likely to provide any real oversight. As described 
above, absent special circumstances, intermediaries generally have no duty to 
determine the policyholders’ needs or determine the coverage the policyholder 
should purchase.199 Importantly, advertising that the AI will find the “best” or 
“full” coverage for applicants will not create that relationship.200 Insurers and 
intermediaries deploying AI and robo-advisers will likely skirt the line in ad-
vertising their services and engineer the interface with the applicant in such a 
way that they do not create a special relationship with the consumer. This is 
made more problematic by the social meaning often placed on AI, where peo-
ple seem to think that computers can solve any problem.201 Thus, although 
consumers may believe that they are getting the kind of specialized advice that 
creates a special relationship, insurers and intermediaries—which are in the 
best position to know the limit of the law—will likely design the interface in a 
way that does not create broad duties. 
Perhaps the law will adapt to create new or different liabilities for robo-
advisors than for human intermediaries. Here, one might consider that acci-
dents involving autonomous cars might invoke product liability rather than 
negligence. Will something similar change in the liability that attaches to in-
termediaries? If so, questions will arise about how to determine whether the AI 
is working properly and giving non-negligent advice. 
But regulators can act now to create some level of protection in the new 
market. Regulators must first be able to evaluate the technology that matches 
consumers to a set of policies or carriers for quality, accuracy, and bias.202 Giv-
en the weakness of the liability rules, regulators should also proactively evalu-
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ate the algorithms to make sure they match consumers to policies appropriately 
and make sure the choice architecture—the steps the AI leads a consumer 
through to pick policy options and carriers—leads consumers to the right cov-
erage. To do so, regulators must build capacity to consider whether the choice 
architecture suggests that consumers purchase unnecessary policy options, too 
much or too little coverage, or miss policy options altogether.203 Further, given 
the velocity with which the insurance industry changes, regulators must create 
some method of ensuring that AI is updated regularly. To combat potential con-
flicts and agency costs, regulators should mandate that third-party AI interme-
diaries disclose how they are being compensated. And, as with other uses of 
AI, regulators must consider how the information provided to the AI is protect-
ed from future disclosure. 
B. Fraud Investigations 
Insurers can also use AI to help evaluate fraud claims. An insurer’s single 
biggest expense is payment of claims.204 Some portion of those claims are 
fraudulent—representing inflated values, losses that never occurred, losses that 
policyholders intentionally cause, or are from policyholders that paid lower pre-
miums by misrepresenting their riskiness in their insurance application.205 There 
is some debate about the amount of fraud that occurs, but it is fair to say that 
insurers are significantly concerned about reducing costs related to insurance 
fraud.206 AI provides new avenues for reducing the costs associated with fraud. 
Insurers can use AI in several ways. After a policyholder makes a claim, 
insurers could use AI to determine whether the policyholder was truthful in his 
or her application. In some circumstances, misstatements by applicants could 
allow the insurer to rescind the policy and avoid paying the claim. Insurers 
could also use AI to more easily and cheaply detect and eliminate fraud. Here, 
insurers could use AI to identify both fraudulent and non-fraudulent claims 
limiting both type I and type II errors.207 Moreover, insurers could use AI to 
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better estimate the actual cost of loss and eliminate fraudulent over-claiming. 
Third, insurers could use AI to sequence the payment of claims more efficient-
ly, saving both insurers and claimants time and money. 
These uses, however, raise several concerns. AI might provide insurers a 
new avenue for denying claims based on the pejoratively-termed practice of 
post-claim underwriting. AI might also make it less expensive to investigate 
claims, making it cheaper for insurers to delay or deny the payment of valid 
claims. Also, AI might create a mechanism for insurers to limit claim awards 
below the amount requested by the policyholder to the precise amount that poli-
cyholders will accept without complaining. These concerns are addressed below. 
1. Post-Claim Underwriting 
Insurers have traditionally relied on the information provided by appli-
cants on their insurance applications to underwrite and price policies. This ap-
plicant-provided information has traditionally been a necessary part of solving 
insurer-side information asymmetries.208 When applicants lie or misrepresent 
important facts about themselves to obtain coverage or cheaper rates, insurers 
have a number of legal options. Those options represent a judicially-created 
balance between the insurer’s right to information and the policyholder’s right 
to make mistakes. AI might tip this balance toward the insurer. 
When an applicant knowingly makes a fraudulent statement, the applicant 
may be subject to criminal sanctions, forfeiture of the payments, and rescission 
of the contract.209 Where applicants do not intentionally defraud the insurer, 
but still make mistakes on their application, an insurer is protected if the mis-
statements are both material and if the insurer relied on the misstatements in 
setting rates or deciding whether to offer specific policy terms.210 This standard 
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strikes a balance between the insurer’s information needs and the policyhold-
er’s right to make a mistake. Insurers need accurate information to determine 
the appropriate terms and price for a policy. Accurately pricing and pooling 
policyholders allows insurers to combat adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
to create fair terms for the members of each risk pool. But punishing a policy-
holder for any misstatement might be unduly harsh. There is no reason to do 
so, for example, when the statements are irrelevant to the insurer.211 
As discussed above, AI allows insurers to rely on a greater number of data 
points in pricing. This means that some additional number of statements by the 
applicant might be relevant for pricing and thus potentially material for pur-
poses of a misrepresentation claim. This also means that policyholders will be 
responsible for the accuracy of more information they include in applications, 
but it will not be obvious which factors are relevant. When insurers use stand-
ard statistical techniques, humans must drive the analysis with intuition about 
what factors will be causal to an insured loss. For example, it is easy to see the 
link between age and likelihood of death. Therefore, it would be easy to see 
why life insurance companies would charge more to insure older policyhold-
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ers, and concomitantly that an applicant who misstates her age is understating 
her risk of loss.212 
AI changes this. Neither insurers, intermediaries, nor potential policy-
holders necessarily know what information on an application is relevant for 
setting the terms of the policy. Algorithms mask the particular factors that are 
correlated to risk. Some examples should help show the problems inherent in 
using the old standard of materiality to judge statements found correlated to 
risk by an algorithm. 
Imagine that in applying for homeowners insurance, an applicant lists his 
first name as “Bud,” rather than “Bernard.” All of his friends call him “Bud,” 
and although he usually lists his given name on legal documents, he simply 
forgot on this day to put “Bernard.” Imagine further that an algorithm deter-
mines that people with the name Bernard are more likely to suffer a loss.213 
One could construct a plausible, if unlikely, narrative for why this might be 
true: men named Bud are handy and can fix things around the house; men with 
the name Bernard are less likely to be able to keep a house in the same work-
ing order as people named Bud. The narrative, however, is less important than 
the correlation. So long as the difference between how the insurer priced the 
policy and how it would have priced the policy had it known the applicant’s 
real name is substantial, this is likely a material misstatement.214  
Consider alternatively a fairly standard question for homeowners: do you 
own a dog or any exotic pets? The obvious, ex ante concern for an insurer is 
liability for an animal bite, liability for other damage caused by the pet, or for 
the loss of the pet itself. But imagine that a crafty AI finds that people who 
own particular animals or particular breeds of dog are riskier for other types of 
liability.215 For example, those who own pit bulls are less likely to take care of 
their property and therefore incur more slip and fall liability. This second-order 
link is not necessarily predictable before contracting. But under the current 
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standard, so long as the pricing difference is substantial, it would be considered 
material. 
The question—assuming that the difference between the price offered for 
the policy based on the misstated information and the price the insurer would 
have offered had it known the truth is substantial—is should an insurer be able 
to avoid paying claims based on those misstatements? 
First, Bud’s misstatement is not the kind of predictable linkage that is 
generally seen in misrepresentation cases. Neither the applicant nor the insurer 
had any reason to believe that the name of the applicant was going to be rele-
vant to the premium price. Yet, an insurer can plausibly argue that a reasonable 
insurer using AI to price risk, that is, a similarly situated insurer, would use 
information about the link between an applicant’s first name and loss to set a 
price for the policy. Further, an insurer could argue, based on its algorithms, 
that it would have applied a different price had it known the applicant’s first 
name. These arguments, if accepted, fulfill both the objective and subjective 
standards for misrepresentation.216 
Perhaps there is some pressure to be applied to the objective portion of 
the standard. It is possible that a court would reject the argument that it is rea-
sonable to use algorithms that spit out correlations with little obvious causal 
narrative. But, if other companies are using AI, even if those companies come 
up with different correlations to loss, the lack of a causal story may not matter. 
That is, if AI becomes the industry norm, all insurers will find correlations to 
loss that are not intuitive. If all companies do it, it will become presumptively 
reasonable. This highlights a critical issue for the objective portion of the mis-
representation test: as use of AI to price risk spreads, courts might be forced to 
accept whatever correlations the algorithms find as objectively reasonable. 
Further, if AI becomes the norm, it is the input, rather than the output, that will 
be reasonable. So long as most insurers price policies using algorithms, a court 
would accept any correlation that any given algorithm divines, regardless of 
whether other algorithms used by other insurers have found that connection. 
Indeed, if all insurers are using the same standards, the algorithms are simply 
keeping pace with the field, not creating a competitive advantage. Thus, it is 
the input—the algorithm—rather than the output—the particular correlation—
that is being judged. 
The second hypothetical, like the first, suggests a lack of predictability, 
but for different reasons. Even if it is predictable that owning a particular pet 
or particular breed of pet is relevant to pricing, neither applicants nor insurers 
are likely to predict the loss to which the algorithms suggest correlation. In 
other words, the parties to the insurance contract may believe ex ante that own-
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ing a particular type of pet will increase premiums out of a joint recognition 
that the pet increases the likelihood of liability for the behavior of the pet. But 
most would not predict that there is necessarily a link between owning particu-
lar animals and other types of risky behavior. Thus, if there were the kind of 
second-order loss predicted by the AI, the insurer might be able to avoid cov-
erage. A court might be forced to accept a misrepresentation defense if an in-
surer could prove the work of the algorithm, despite the fact that neither party 
to contract considered pet-ownership relevant to the second-order loss at the 
time of contracting. 
These examples suggest that AI may undermine the balance created by 
the standard for misrepresentation. Insurers’ need for accurate information—
which is, of course, important—should not make it impossible for policyhold-
ers to make mistakes in the application process. By making any statement on 
an application potentially relevant to any loss, AI forces policyholders to bear a 
greater portion of the risk of mistake than under traditional pricing. With AI 
analyzing risk, any statement could be relevant to setting the rates or the terms 
of the policy. If true, any statement in a policy could be material and, once 
again, policyholders could be warrantors of the statements they make in appli-
cations. Courts must adjust their standards or lose the long-ago earned protec-
tions for policyholders. 
2. AI and Policyholder Claims 
AI and big data can also reduce the costs of identifying and investigating 
fraudulent claims and the administration of those claims. Although fraud is a 
major concern for insurers, the number of fraudulent claims is likely quite 
small relative to the total number of claims, and insurers might have a difficult 
time distinguishing legitimate from fraudulent claims.217 Making good deci-
sions at this stage is important, because investigations are not free and investi-
gating every claim for potential fraud would be prohibitively expensive. Insur-
ers want to make sure that they neither investigate too many claims nor ignore 
too many claims that could be flagged as potentially fraudulent. AI could help 
with this. 
Insurers are sitting on reams of data from past claims and they have ac-
cess to mountains of new information. Put together, and sifted by AI, these da-
ta could be used to identify patterns in claims and refine which claims to inves-
tigate.218 Insurers have long looked at a number of external data, including 
“sudden increases in a policyholder’s need for cash, inconsistencies in an in-
jured party’s medical evaluations, or the presence of accelerants at the site of a 
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fire.”219 Today, insurers regularly search social media sites manually for evi-
dence of fraud.220 For example, posting on social media about vigorous exer-
cise after claiming a serious injury in an auto accident could be red flag for 
fraud investigators. AI opens up new avenues for research with both past 
claims data and this external data. For example, insurers are increasingly using 
AI to automatically comb through websites instead of searching manually.221 
Algorithms might find linkages between certain types of posts and fraud 
claims and thus significantly reduce investigation costs. This could help reduce 
both type I and type II errors by helping to identify fraudulent claims previous-
ly undiscovered by traditional methods and by weeding out legitimate claims 
that were previously investigated for fraud.222 
Insurers can also use AI to help prioritize claims for handling.223 Insurers 
that can identify which claims are likely to settle for higher amounts have a 
competitive advantage: they can handle the high-dollar claims internally quick-
ly and outsource the low value claims.224 This again helps reduce investigation 
costs and the potential of bad faith suits if insurers can pay legitimate claims 
more quickly. 
Theoretically, insurers that use AI to weed out fraud and prioritize claims 
for handling are saving both themselves and their policyholders money. By 
identifying fraud through automation, insurers could save on the labor costs 
associated with manual fraud investigation.225 Moreover, assuming that the 
algorithms do a better job identifying which claims are likely to be fraudulent, 
insurers can save because they investigate fewer claims that turn out to be le-
gitimate losses and identify otherwise unidentified fraudulent claims. This 
should save on investigation costs and result in fewer expenses for claims. But, 
these theoretical savings suggest some very real concerns.226 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Id. (citing ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, INSURANCE FRAUD HANDBOOK 42–102 
(2009)). 
 220 Young Ha, In Few Years, Social Network Data May Be Used in Underwriting, INS. J. (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/10/13/219764.htm [https://perma.cc/
V3S2-ANAY]. 
 221 See Mohan Babu & Soumya Chattopadhyay, Claims Fraud: A Big Opportunity for Big Data 
& Analytics, CLAIMS J. (July 29, 2013), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2013/07/29/
233805.htm [https://perma.cc/E49Z-VS32]. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id.; NYCE, supra note 207, at 7. 
 224 See NYCE, supra note 207, at 7. 
 225 This assumes that the startup and maintenance costs of running the algorithms are less than the 
labor costs. 
 226 Here, this Article assume that insurers will not intentionally use their position of power to 
investigate claims they know are legitimate to simply delay payment or intentionally discount claims 
because they divine that policyholders will not sue over a certain amount of underpayment. 
2082 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2031 
Insurers could, because of the lower identification and investigation costs, 
decide to flag a broader range of potentially fraudulent claims for investiga-
tion. Insurers that delay paying claims, whether fraudulent or not, can make 
money on the float. This could lead to opportunistic behavior where insurers 
intentionally deny or delay paying claims in the hopes that policyholders will 
abandon them, allowing the insurers to avoid paying out.227 But one need not 
assume that insurers act opportunistically. If AI reduces the cost of identifying 
and investigating claims, it may be reasonable to investigate a greater number 
of—more cheaply discovered—potentially fraudulent claims. So long as the 
cost of identification and investigation (plus the expected value of a bad-faith 
suit) is less than the reward of keeping the premiums and the expected value of 
finding additional fraudulent claims, insurers may choose to investigate addi-
tional claims. This is not necessarily opportunistic because insurers could have 
some seemingly legitimate reason for performing the investigation, but it could 
impact policyholders negatively by delaying payments of otherwise legitimate 
claims. 
More insidiously, AI might be learning to chisel away at legitimate 
claims. At the first step of deciding to pay a claim, the AI must value the loss; 
it might determine that the claims represent real losses, but at inflated prices. 
This might be an innocent mistake on the part of the AI, but it might also be a 
feature of learning algorithms. The insurer likely instructs the AI to pay the 
lowest reasonable amount for a claim. When the AI receives negative feedback 
about its offers—such as when policyholders complain about the amount of the 
offer, sue for bad faith, or switch carriers—it will likely increase the offer to 
future policyholders with similar losses. But if the AI does not receive negative 
feedback, when the AI is presented with a similar loss in the future, it will like-
ly offer the policyholder less to settle the claim. 
There are a number of reasons why policyholders might not complain and 
give the AI a reason to increase its offer in future claims: policyholders might 
not know how much their claim is really worth and may accept the insurer’s 
valuation; the difference between the insurer’s offer to settle and the policy-
holder’s claim might not be enough to justify a fight; policyholders might not 
have the resources or sophistication to fight the insurer or to bring a bad faith 
suit; and the transaction costs for switching insurers might be too high. The 
concern is that the AI can, through its iterative process, learn how low its offer 
can be before it gets any negative feedback. In effect, the AI is learning to 
price claims at the lowest point possible to extract the most amount from poli-
cyholders without negative feedback. 
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In short, although AI might help identify fraud with more precision, there 
are potential concerns with this lower-cost method for identifying and investi-
gating fraud. Regulators often use policyholder complaints to identify prob-
lems in the claims process. But with AI driving the analysis, those complaints 
may not materialize in sufficient numbers to trigger investigation. In fact, the 
AI might be designed to delay payment or price the payment at a level that 
avoids those kinds of complaints, but this does not mean that insurers are liv-
ing up to their promises. The insurer might be delaying or lowering payments 
just to point of pain, but no further.  
Given this, it is difficult to offer solutions to these problems. But a good 
start would be making more information available to the public. Most state 
regulators require insurers to report data on claims, rate of payment, and speed 
of payment, but keep that information largely secret.228 Providing more infor-
mation might allow researchers the opportunity to evaluate the quality of the 
claims processes. 
CONCLUSION 
The business of insurance is changing. At the front end of insurance rela-
tionships, algorithms are helping insurers price their products both by finding 
more precise correlations to loss and by determining the exact amount a con-
sumer is willing to pay for coverage. Insurers are also using—or will soon be 
using—algorithms to advise consumers about the best policies to buy, tailor 
the terms and types of coverage specifically for each individual, and dynami-
cally turn coverages on and off. At the back end, insurers are using AI both to 
root out fraud in applications and claims and to sequence claims for payments 
in unique and efficient ways. 
The introduction of these new technologies is disrupting the premises of 
insurance regulation. AI is fundamentally different from the statistical tech-
niques that once drove these same functions. Humans and human intuition do 
not underlie AI processes. AI works as an unstructured, iterative process to 
find correlations or solutions to problems posed by data scientists. These solu-
tions are often unexpected and may not have easy or obvious causal stories. 
That is itself a big change. 
Regulating in this new era requires some thought. These new algorithmic 
methods could, as described above, undermine protections built into insurance 
regulation, but they could also minimize some of the concerns that drove regu-
lation in the first place. So, at bottom, these changes require some careful 
thinking about why insurance is regulated, and how. 
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As described above, insurance regulation exists both to correct market 
failures and to protect insurance markets in light of the important role that in-
surance plays in society. To do this work, regulators—including state insurance 
commissioners, legislatures, and courts—have erected a series of structures 
designed to prevent opportunism, correct the behavioral quirks of insurance 
purchasers, and socialize risks more broadly. 
To continue to do this work, regulators must ensure that they have the 
ability, technical expertise, and information from insurers necessary to evaluate 
what AI is doing and why. In the realm of pricing, that might mean obtaining 
more data from insurers to see what the algorithms are using to price risk, and 
allowing insurers to gather data (and provide that data to regulators) to deter-
mine whether vulnerable groups are paying more for insurance. But regulators 
cannot stop there. Not all disparate impacts are the same, so regulators must 
further determine whether the impacts matter for a given category and line of 
insurance. Regulators must also consider whether, and how, price discrimina-
tion is affecting consumers. Insurance is far too important to ignore this exces-
sive and discriminatory pricing completely, as has been done in other consum-
er contexts. 
Regulators must further build capacity to evaluate the technology that is 
enabling robo-advice, including the matching algorithms and the decision en-
gines that provide consumers with advice about the types of coverages to buy. 
They should also insist on regular updating of the algorithms and force some 
disclosure about how intermediaries are paid and how consumer data is protect-
ed. Additionally, as new forms of insurance come into existence, regulators must 
consider whether consumers are still afforded the traditional guaranteed protec-
tions in terms of clarity and amount of coverage offered. Lastly, regulators 
should consider making claims data available so researchers can carefully con-
sider whether insurers are acting opportunistically in investigating fraud and 
making payments. Doing these things will provide the kinds of protections that 
the insurance markets need given the special role insurance plays in society. 
